Chapter 2 of “Proving History” is entitled “The Basics”, but what’s mainly of interest here is Carrier’s description of the historical method. Carrier outlines twelve axioms of historical analysis, which I want to go through in some detail. As befitting axioms, some of them are obvious and seem reasonable, but some of them aren’t and even for the ones that seem reasonable at times Carrier will use them in a self-serving way.
The first axiom is “The basic principle of rational-empirical history is that all conclusions must logically follow from the evidence available to all observers.” This one basically excludes things like personal feelings or intuitions as being primary evidence, and insists that the arguments must not include logical fallacies. This is, therefore, a fair if unimpressive one, but to be fair to Carrier he does claim it a very basic principle. It also works as a principle for the academic field of history, but doesn’t really hold up as a principle for what people believe is true of history or as a principle for religious believers to decide if they want to maintain a belief in a real existent Jesus. If historical analysis proves that there was no actual historical Jesus, then everyone would need to accept that, but if it doesn’t then the personal beliefs of people could be based on things like intuitions or feelings. To be fair, Carrier is indeed outlining what we’d want for academic historical analysis, but as always in situations like this we need to watch out for arguments that say that if you can’t establish your case to that level then you can’t even believe it true. But ultimately as a basic principle or axiom this one works.
The second axiom is “The correct procedure in historical analysis is to seek a consensus among all qualified experts who agree with the basic principle of rational-empirical history (and who practice what they preach)”.
This one is a bit tougher to deal with, because at the outset it seems reasonable but when we look deeper there are a number of qualifiers that might cause some issues. It seems reasonable that everyone would agree or need to agree to present arguments that are logically valid and sound and that don’t rely on evidence that isn’t available to everyone assessing the argument. But then we might wonder if some people might consider the personal commentaries of historical figures to not count as objective evidence. So either no one in the debate will ever argue over that, or there will be lots of arguments over what that basic principle really entails. We can also wonder why the correct procedure is to seek a consensus rather than to build a proper argument, even if others don’t agree with you. This then leads to a concern that “qualified” experts might be interpreted narrowly so that ones that disagree with the conclusion are somehow considered “unqualified”, especially given that often Carrier himself will claim that the only reason some experts will disagree with him is because they are motivated by feelings or intuitions or biases. And then we can see that this principle falls directly in being an Argument from Authority, where the goal is to reach a consensus of purported experts and thus filter out any arguments from those who are not experts. But a consensus of experts can be wrong, and a non-expert can still have the correct argument. It is indeed the case that if all the relevant experts are acting properly and honestly and we have a valid and sound argument, we should end up with all the experts agreeing, but it’s clearly not the case that that should be our goal and so that it should be the second axiom of historical analysis.
The third axiom is “Overconfidence is fallacious; admitting ignorance or uncertainty is not”.
The first issue here is that Carrier is comparing what is clearly an incorrect or fallacious case on the one hand with a case that isn’t on the other. Confidence is not fallacious, but overconfidence is, because the latter simply means being more confident than the situation warrants. By the same token, admitting ignorance or being uncertain is not fallacious, but being overly skeptical is. It’s just as much an error to claim the argument is less certain than it is as it is to claim that it is more certain than it is. And Carrier himself falls into this with his discussion here, as he says “One thing professional historians soon learn is how much we need to accept the fact that we will never know most of what we want to know — such as about Jesus or the origins of Christianity, or anything else in history”. First of, what suggests that this might be self-serving is that the first example he jumps to is the very one that he’s trying to argue for, so he immediately starts to imply that we don’t know all that much about the very topic that we will be debating, and so is basically trying to “poison the well” against those who think the question is settled. He may be right that we don’t know what we want to know, but we might well know what we want to know as well.
Which also strikes against the rest of the quote, since he mentions Richard Nixon and Mark Twain and says that we know less about Jesus than we know about them, and we have gaps in our knowledge about them. Maybe so, but we also know a great number of things about them. If we interpret this principle as “Don’t overstate your confidence if you don’t have sufficient evidence to back it up”, it’s not an unreasonable principle, but we know that we can know things even in ancient history to a great degree of certainty and so might be able to settle the Jesus question if we have sufficient evidence to make a good argument. So he seems to be introducing this to use it as a bludgeon against people who claim that have enough evidence to determine that Jesus really existed, but that doesn’t require a principle. And given that we can know things about history, it’s pretty useless as a principle, especially given that overconfidence and underconfidence are both errors that we should avoid.
The fourth axiom is “Every claim has a nonzero probability of being true or false (unless its being true or false is logically impossible.”
This one is either completely uninteresting or just plain wrong. Let’s take the “just plain wrong” argument first. In line with the arguments about the previous axiom, there are things that we can just plain know, even about Jesus. For example, we know that the statement “Jesus was born in Detroit, Michigan, United States of America” is unequivocally false, because we have records that mentioned him long before that city existed. On the other end, we know that the statement “Julius Caesar is a man is unequivocally true. There is absolutely no reasonable probability that the first statement is true and the second statement is false. So the only move Carrier can make here is to argue that he can come up with some theory such that those theories could in theory fit the evidence which would technically mean that it has a nonzero probability, but we still wouldn’t even bother to take that seriously. It turns out, then, that are a lot of claims whose probability is so low that we don’t need to bother even considering them, making this statement meaningless.
The thing is, this axiom again seems to be self-serving. Carrier wants to say this so that he can support his Bayesian approach, and would like argue here that we couldn’t come to the conclusion that the statements I’ve listed really have a probability so low that we don’t need to consider them unless we ran the probability analysis to get that number. But that isn’t what we do with those sorts of claims. Instead, we look to see if we have any reason to accept that claim. Carrier might try to spin an argument that Jesus could have been born in Detroit through some sort of time travel/alien influence/sorcery argument, but we have no reason to think that at all true. Since his argument, then, would clearly be made up we would dismiss it on that grounds, no matter what contortions Carrier went through to establish that it had a significant probability. This is the same issue Carrier has when he argues that Jesus being an alien is more probable than His being divine, as we have no reason to think that an alien was involved at all and so we have no reason to think an alien was involved other than Carrier’s invented probabilities. So we aren’t using probabilities at all to filter that out, and it’s clear that Carrier’s axiom is either false or meaningless, so we have no reason to accept it.
The fifth axiom is “Any argument relying on the inference “possibly, therefore probably” is fallacious.” This one is one of Carrier’s personal pet peeves, and while his argument is technically true, Carrier tends to overextend it to apply to arguments that are not attempt to show that the things are therefore probable, but instead are only using the bare possibility of their explanation to show that an argument that it is not possible for a piece of evidence to fit with their theory is itself not adequately supported. Since this is what Carrier himself claims to be doing in his argument against Kipp Davis, it’s clearly not invalid, and we can easily assess invalid uses of bare possibility without having an entire axiom talking about that.
The sixth axiom is “An effective consensus of qualified experts constitutes meeting an initial burden of evidence.” Assuming he means “burden of proof” here, this isn’t unreasonable, in the sense that we should accept what the qualified experts think is true unless we have good reason to think it isn’t. However, Carrier clearly thinks he has such an argument for his mythicism, so it isn’t necessarily all that difficult to overcome this, and so we can again ask why this is an axiom itself as opposed to something we consider. Anyone who goes against the consensus will think that they have good reason to oppose it, so this isn’t doing anything, at least not for historians themselves, and non-historians, as I said above, are free to use less formal methods to come to their conclusions.
The seventh axiom is “Facts must be distinguished from theories”. Again, this seems pretty obvious, but Carrier again focuses on an argument against Christianity and, of course, ultimately we will need to validate and accept our theories as well, making this somewhat pointless. I will note here that Carrier really should have applied these to cases that aren’t related to his own debate here to make it clear that this is how history generally works, as opposed to using it to set things up for his own preferred theory in the historicism vs mythicism debate.
The eighth axiom is “A conclusion is only as certain as its weakest premise”. Carrier, to his credit, uses a non-Jesus historical example here, but this again is pretty banal and doesn’t seem to rise to the level of a key axiom. He talked about finding the weakest link in an argument, but that’s basic reasoning, and so doesn’t need to be stated here, and it is possible for a conclusion to fit the rest of the evidence so well that we can use that conclusion itself to validate that “weak” premise: the conclusion fits the evidence so well that if that premise is not true we would have to accept a different and completely unreasonable conclusion, and so we could strengthen that purportedly weaker premise because it is necessary for the stronger supported conclusion to be true. So really, this sounds like a platitude more than a truly important axiom.
The ninth axiom is “The strength of any claim is proportional to the strength of the evidence supporting it”. This basically means that a claim is only as strong as the evidence we have for it, which is hardly ground-breaking, although in this case unlike the last one at least it remains true when we take a closer look at it.
The tenth axiom is “Weak claims that contradict strong claims are probably false (and not the other way around).” This again seems obvious, but then I have to wonder why he feels the need to mention it. Which, given the rest of these axioms, makes me wonder if Carrier is misinterpreting their claim there when he says that too often they appeal to a weaker argument. Again, it could be an appeal to base possibility, which would be weaker by definition but would always rebut a claim that there is no reasonable way to make the claim fit the evidence.
The eleventh axiom is “Generalizations must be supported by evidence, and that evidence must consist of more than one example (or of an example that strongly implies a general trend), and once supported, cannot be ignored.” This translates to “Support your generalizations with arguments”, which most people do, so this sounds like a pet peeve and, in line with the other arguments, is one where Carrier might be misunderstanding the purpose of the argument or the argument that is being given. In general, we don’t need an axiom to cover off clearly invalid arguments, and that’s all Carrier seems to be taking aim at, with perhaps a corollary that we should take his generalizations seriously.
The final axiom is “When any of us cites a scholar, it should only be assumed we agree with what they say that is essential to the point we cite them of.” This is another pet peeve of Carrier’s (from reading his posts) and so hardly rises to the level of an axiom. Everyone who challenges him will claim that he needs to agree with them on that point or that the rest of his comments that he agrees with that point as well, and if they do it wrong we don’t need to appeal to this axiom but instead can simply point out that the argument doesn’t have that implication.
To finish off the chapter, Carrier lists twelve rules. I’m not going to go through those in detail, but I will list them here. For those who know Carrier’s work, see how many of them you think he himself breaks on a regular basis, or that are so qualified as to be meaningless. For me, the fifth one about avoiding hyperbole seems the most ironic given that he has actually argued that Jesus literally being a space alien is the best interpretation of what ancient Jews actually believed.
Rule 1: Obey the Twelve Axioms (given above) and Bayes’s Theorem (articulated in the remainder of this book). This does not mean that you must use Bayes’s Theorem in any mathematical sense, only that any historical argument you employ must not violate Bayes’s Theorem.
Rule 2: Develop wide expertise in the period, topics, languages, and materials that you intend to blaze any trails in, or else base all your assumptions in these areas on the established (and properly cited) findings of those who have.
Rule 3: Check all claims against the evidence and scholarship, especially generalizations and assumptions (i.e. don’t assume that because you heard or read it somewhere or it just seems plausible that therefore it’s likely or true).
Rule 4: Confirm that an argument follows from the original language of a text with as much assurance as from your preferred translation. And confirm that your preferred translation fits the original context (both textual and sociocultural).
Rule 5: Phrase all your claims for optimal truth value. Use all necessary qualifications; avoid hyperbole; do not state as fact what is not fact or as certain what is not certain; always express degrees of certainty or uncertainty when appropriate; acknowledge the difference between a speculation and an assertion; and concede when more evidence is needed.
Rule 6: Don’t conflate weakly supported claims with strongly supported claims, or confuse theories with facts or speculations with theories. Always be explicit in your writings as to which is which.
Rule 7: Address all relevant and significant evidence against what you claim (including any relevant arguments from silence against what you claim).
Rule 8: Take into account problems of chronological development. Everything changed over time, and documents written much later may or may not reflect earlier views or practices, regardless of what they claim. Hence, for example, any argument for influence requires evidence not just of parallels and similarities but of the causal direction of the influence (although this works both ways: just because one source comes later than another does not entail the causal direction runs the same way, as the later source could still be attesting a tradition that predates the earlier source).
Rule 9: Always cite your primary evidence, or cite sources that either cite the relevant primary evidence themselves or cite further sources that collectively do (primary evidence being the earliest surviving evidence in the chain of causation, e.g. a modern or medieval historian citing an ancient historian is not primary evidence if the original text of that ancient historian survives, because then that is the primary evidence). In other words, never make controversial assertions without leaving a trail of sources and evidence sufficient to confirm those assertions are true,
Rule 10: Avoid reliance on scholarship published prior to 1950 and rely as much as possible on scholarship published after 1970. Work published prior to 1950 need not be ignored, but it should not be relied upon if at all possible. Except perhaps for archaeology and philology (e.g., observational reporting and textual criticism), old work should be avoided altogether or employed only when supported by later work (or your own independent verification).
Rule 11: Always report what the most recent general scholarship says on a subject, or what the current leading consensus is, if either is different from your own view. Do not give the impression that a view contrary to the leading consensus is the consensus or that a maverick view is the normal view.
Rule 12: Admit when you are wrong and publish a correction or revision. Constantly seek expert criticism to refine your work in this very respect.
Next up, the first chapter on Bayes’ Theorem itself. There’s a lot to say about that, as that’s the chapter that forced me to stop reading to write that all out, so expect a few posts on it.
Thoughts on “Benson”
August 29, 2023So after finishing off “The Dick Van Dyke Show”, I switched over to watching “Benson” on CTV Throwback. “Benson” was a show that I watched as a kid that was a spinoff from “Soap” — and done by the same creator, I think — which I had watched for the first time a few years ago.
The premise is that Benson Dubois, the butler from “Soap”, comes to work managing the household of a state governor who is a cousin of Jessica Tate from “Soap”, who recommends him for the job to give her cousin a hand. The governor is a bit loopy, so much so that it’s a puzzle how he got elected in the first place. He’s also a single father, raising a young daughter in Katie after his wife died. Benson also immediately clashes with Kraus, the woman who manages the kitchens and maids who has survived multiple governors and plans to survive this one, and resents Benson’s attempts to manage the household and save money. As the series progresses, Benson advances to become the Budget Director for the state, and finally to Lieutenant Governor. There are some other characters, starting from one guy who was the Chief of Staff and was replaced in season 2 by the more familiar Clayton, and a secretary named Marcie who was replaced at about the same time. There was also a Press Secretary who was played by Ethan Phillips. Since Clayton was placed by Rene Auberjonois, that meant that you had Odo and Neelix on the same show. The series ends with Benson and the Governor facing off in a race to become the next governor of the state, and ends on a cliffhanger as we never find out which of them won.
The most interesting thing from my perspective is how different my approach to this series was from “The Dick Van Dyke Show”. My main feeling about that show was that it was neither really good nor really bad, which meant that I ended up dragging it out a bit. With other things that I wanted to do and with no reason to either sit down and watch it because it was so good or rush through it because it was so bad it was just too easy to let other things cut into my viewing time for it or even replace it entirely. But with “Benson”, the opposite was true. Sure, the things I wanted to do ended up sliding out a bit and so ending earlier, but I also looked forward to watching “Benson” every night and so even quit what I was doing a bit early so that I could. I definitely enjoyed this series more than “The Dick Van Dyke Show”.
A big part of the reason is Benson himself. Robert Guillaume does a wonderful job portraying someone who is more than willing to snark at the things that he sees as stupid and annoying and so drive a lot of the humour and yet is also clearly someone who cares about people, both the people in the mansion and people in general, which follows him as he goes through his various promotions. The worst episodes were the ones where Benson is more panicked and cowardly and the best ones are the ones where he acts cleverly to get what he wants from people who don’t want him to have it, or to fix problems for the people he cares about. Benson is competent and snarky and yet flawed enough to sometimes get in over his head and needs advice from other people.
In the early seasons, Katie is a character that is used really well. Her most common use is to provide humour with how she acts older than her age, commenting on things in ways that someone her age shouldn’t but in a way that shows that she’s been involved in politics and so understands it. But her most important use is to show a softer side to people as they show that they care about her. This is important for Benson as he becomes her confidant and gets into the good graces of the Governor by helping her with her problems, but it is actually even more important for Kraus. Kraus fights with Benson a lot and is a pretty harsh character, and it would be easy for us to think of her as a bad person given that we are inclined to like Benson as he’s the main character. And yet she gets a number of scenes where she is very kind and nice to Katie, which shows that she isn’t as hard a person as she might seem, which then shows that her clashes with Benson are not her being mean just to be mean, but are clashes of attitude and a feeling that they are getting in the way of each other doing their jobs. This base is incredibly important for later when they clearly become vitriolic best buds and she even becomes his trusted assistant at the end. It would have seemed to happen too quickly if they hadn’t used that base of her being nice to Katie to show that she’s not a bad person at all, just someone who clashes with Benson.
Katie doesn’t get used as much in the last couple of seasons, but I do have to say that Missy Gold, even from a young age, did a really good job with that character, being believable even as she played a character more worldly than a child that age should be.
I remembered the Governor himself as being, well, a goofball and an idiot, but in actuality he was smarter and more principled than I remembered. Yes, he told irrelevant stories a lot of the time, and he often didn’t really get the things he should have, but the show gave him a good reason for that: he wasn’t really a politician, at least at first. The party needed someone honest and he fit the bill, and he maintained his principled attitude throughout the show, and often showed cleverness in seeing hidden traps in things and how they’d violate his principles, and he was also always willing to stand up for his principles. This made him a more interesting character than a mere simpleton even as it allowed him to act stupidly to drive the humour.
I actually liked both Marcie and her replacement in Denise. Marcie was competent and relatively nice, but early on had that character trait of desperately trying to find a man which considering how smart, nice and pretty she was strained credulity. She worked better when she finally found someone, but then moved away and out of the show. Denise was a bit more ditzy, but it was less that she wasn’t smart and more than she didn’t see things the same way most other people do, and was explicitly incredibly gifted at mathematics, which is what got her the job. She was also incredibly nice, which is why I didn’t care for her relationship with Pete, the Press Secretary, who was selfish, cheap and often insulting to her. Early on, he asks her out, she accepts, but then has to cancel because she has to cover for someone else, and he takes it poorly to her face and then gripes that no woman would date him. The problem was that he had acted like a jerk towards her and her excuse wasn’t merely an excuse, and she herself didn’t care for what he had said to her. If he had accepted it graciously and then simply griped to Benson about how women don’t really want to date him so that Benson could set him straight, then that would have been one thing, but instead he acts like a jerk and yet we’re expected to think that he would work with a nice person like Denise. And he doesn’t get any better, for the most part. Making all of this worse is that he meets Denise right after she comments that she’s single because she’s looking for someone special, which spawns the reaction of “And you think that’s Pete?!?”.
Clayton works well as a foil for Benson since they have completely different and clashing attitudes and backgrounds, and Clayton is given lots of opportunities to show that he’s not completely self-absorbed and is willing to help people out at times, and also that he can rise above his own feelings of superiority to do things that someone with his inflated ego wouldn’t normally do. However, in the later seasons the show makes the mistake of having the governor seem frustrated with him and even to strongly dislike him, which begs the question of why he even keeps him on as Chief of Staff. Yes, Clayton was established as being very good at his job, but in the later seasons the governor never really says that Clayton can be annoying but is good at his job, and so the show just seems to start picking on him in the later seasons, which is all the worse because, again, in earlier seasons he had proven himself willing to help them out when they needed him and it seemed more like a clashing personalities issue than him being a bad person, which makes those things seem to be a bit mean. Admittedly, the last two seasons are where they started to run out of ideas, which makes it a good thing that it ended when it did.
Ultimately, though, “Benson” is a good show. Some episodes are clunkers, but most of them are good and they even have arcs which was a rarity for a non-soap opera sitcom, and even though some of them drag a bit they still basically work. The characters, even the annoying ones, still mostly work and provide decent humour. At the end of the day, I could definitely see myself watching this series again.
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