The next essay in “Doctor Strange and Philosophy” is “Through an Orb Darkly”: Doctor Strange and the Journey to Knowledge by Armond Boudreaux. This explores a storyline in the Doctor Strange comics where in order to hunt down the kidnapper of Clea Strange ends up inside an orb where he cannot trust any of his senses and has no idea what is or isn’t real, and Boudreaux explores what epistemologies he could appeal to in order to gain knowledge.
He explores empiricism and then rationalism, which raises a question that I’ve talked about in the past, which is as those two views were the main competitors for a long time in analytic philosophy which of them, if any, actually won. If you listen to the scientifically minded, it seems like empiricism won and rationalism lost, given that science and most of our knowledge-seeking methods rely on empirical methods and gaining knowledge from the armchair without appealing to “the real world” is denigrated. And yet while I was taking a linguistics course as part of my Cognitive Science studies the professor there declared that rationalism was the clear winner. And since neither of them seem to be able to tell us whether there actually is an external world or not, maybe neither of them have actually managed to win after all.
If we can interpret rationalism as the claim that there are at least some true propositions that we can know the truth of without appealing to empirical knowledge, it looks like rationalism has indeed won. As Boudreaux himself noted, it doesn’t look like we go out in the world and put together two objects and two objects and count them to get four objects to justify that 2+2=4. We can prove that and all systematic mathematical truths through appealing to the mathematical systems that we construct without caring about their instantiations in the world or even without knowing whether or not they have instantiations in the world. So the normal course is more likely to be us inventing mathematical or geometric systems and then looking to see if the world conforms to them rather than the other way around. It seems clear that there is knowledge about the world that we can’t get without looking at the world at all, but it does seem like there are propositions that we can come to know the truth of without appealing to empirical data. This has generally led those of the scientistic bent to claim that the important knowledge that we can and must determine empirically is what counts, and in some cases is even what counts as truth and knowledge entirely. But it does seem like all conceptual truths cannot be known empirically, are truths, and are important ones given that they would at least underlie all mathematical truths. It does seem, however, like the truths that Strange would need in this situation are empirical, not conceptual.
Which leads to Bourdeaux’s segue to Descartes, whose examinations are probably more relevant to Strange’s situation, as his entire schtick was to doubt everything he could and end at an at least mostly conceptual truth — I think, therefore I am — and then try to build back up to trusting one’s senses — and so justifying empiricism — on logically certain steps that could not reasonably be doubted. As Bourdeaux notes, he ultimately had to appeal to God and His nature as an entity that would not deceive us — based on either an Ontological Argument or on a Thomistic one — to do that. As has been noted, the issue is that it is not necessarily unreasonable to doubt whether any kind of God exists, and one can challenge his claim that such a God couldn’t be a deceiver, so it doesn’t quite seem to work without at least a lot more effort. Bourdeaux notes that Strange has someone that he can more or less trust — Agamotto — but we are not really in that case. So how could that work for us?
Well, the first thing to note is that we have rejected Descartes’ insistence that knowledge must be certain and proceed by certain steps that we cannot reasonably doubt. All we need is to be justified, as I noted not too long ago. Given this, we can accept that we could be wrong about there being an external world or that our senses are accurate and still claim that we can reasonably claim that we know the things our senses reveal to us. This, then, would give us the proper contrast between empirical examination and conceptual analysis: the latter is more certain but can apply to all possible worlds — as they describe concepts which are generally used to identify things in the world — and so it is difficult for us to demonstrate that the concepts do apply, at least as described, to this world, like is the case for mathematical systems, while the former definitely seems to appeal to the world we experience, but is more dubious and so is less reliable, and could be totally illusory.
We can’t really appeal to Cartesian certainty to justify the external world, because there would always be too much doubt to justify that move. But could we move from a mostly conceptual truth to an at least reasonable justification? Perhaps we could move from “I think, therefore I am” to “I am experiencing things” to “I seem to be able to take actions that impact those experiences” to then argue for a pragmatic answer: all the evidence I have of the world of experience are those experiences. Those experiences seem at least at first glace to be of an external world. When I act as per those experiences, the experiences act as I would expect from the world of experiences as given. It is also the case that those experiences seem to indicate an external world. So can I not claim that my senses are both giving me a view of an external world and an accurate view of it unless I have reason to think that they aren’t, in the sense that things are inconsistent in a way that violates the basic conceptual truths that I must accept (like, as Boudreaux notes, the Law of Non-Contradiction)? After all, this is what clues Strange in to the world inside the Orb being an illusion, as people who should know him don’t and they don’t act consistently with what he knows of them. Then could someone who wants to challenge the examples of the Brain in a Vat or of us being in the Matrix not say that the person who brings that up would need to show what sort of evidence or inconsistencies we should expect to see in such a situation? If there are some, then we should go and investigate them, and if there aren’t any then we seem to still be justified in trusting our experiences because they could not have given us a real reason to doubt then other than by raising the possibility that they are incorrect … which, by this notion of knowledge, we already knew.
So perhaps that’s the way to escape the conundrum here: to reduce the challenge to one that merely says that our senses could be wrong and there might not be an external world out there, or it may not be at all like our experience tells us it is. But outside of Cartesian certainty the fact that we could be wrong about the things we claim to know does not mean that we are not justified in believing them or even claiming to know those things. And since all we want is knowledge, until we have good reason to think that we actually are in the Matrix, we are justified in saying that we know we aren’t. And, again, that’s all we really want to be able to say.
Additional Thoughts on “Conception Plus”
May 21, 2025I don’t intend to make my thoughts on this game a weekly thing, but I managed to get in a few more sessions than normal at this game and found out some things that I wanted to talk about.
Most of these involve how there are a few more mechanisms than I originally gave it credit for. As I’ve read elsewhere, Speed is indeed the stat to rule them all as it lets you move earlier, which is important for damaging and killing things before they can kill or attack you. However, it’s also really, really important for positioning, which is making sure that the things you don’t want to get hit aren’t in a position to get hit. I had a couple of wipes in the harder zodiac dungeon that I finished — once when I had to suck up it returning me to the surface and losing a week, and once where I just reloaded — and both times my positioning was the problem, where my main character was in a bad position and so attacked more often than was entirely healthy and before he could be healed or react properly. And then when I finally got to the boss of that dungeon I managed to beat it on the first try, where I had one group of Star Children Mechunite — turn into a big mech — and use their bond power to wipe out the helpers and then use regular skills with the help of the main character to finish off the big boss. The boss tended to attack the main character and hit pretty hard, but did just low enough damage for the main character to survive the attack, and then I had one group of Star Children simply use a potion that restores full health to me every turn — I had lots because you get them while grinding and I grind a lot — until the big boss went down. But that was only possible because I moved everyone else to attack the helpers and so be away from the big boss — including the main character — leaving the mech to attack to avoid multi-group attacks from hurting everyone else. So strategies like that are things that I will have to pay attention to going forward.
There’s also more to managing your groups of Star Children than I originally thought and normally did. I started out balancing the groups having at least one cleric and one magician in each and then not repeating characters, but as they hit their max levels I swapped out and since more classes had opened up I didn’t manage to balance that as well. So I don’t think that I have the teams balanced that well, but I’m not really working on that right now. What I had been doing wrong was swapping in Star Children haphazardly instead of going for the ones with the highest max levels, which meant that I had to keep swapping them out after every run, which meant more grinding than I probably needed. And the grinding is very, very boring, so that’s something that I want to avoid, although I need to grind up a set of something like three of them from level 1 for the next dungeon. Yay.
The interactions with the Star Maidens are all right. There are too many of them to level them all up equally, so I’ve been mostly focusing on my favourites, but you can only level them up so far before having to clear another dungeon to advance them further, which means that interacting with them doesn’t do you much good other than giving you bond points — used to Mechunite and to produce new Star Children — so that gives some room to focus on the others. Once you fill one of the levels, you need to Classmate with them to get a scene to allow you to advance further, which also opens up new scenes. There are also story scenes every time you finish a dungeon as well as special events, and the game tends to match you up with various Star Maidens based on your level with them, at one point definitely asking me to choose to listen to the ones that I had a higher bond with and at one point seemingly choosing those who I had lower levels with to give me the chance to advance my levels with them. It’s an okay system and is definitely deeper than that of the Personas, but doesn’t quite have its charm.
So far, I’m still enjoying the game enough despite the grinding to fight my way through it, but the grinding is annoying enough that I am hoping to finish it sooner rather than later.
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