So, Bob Seidensticker has made two posts talking about Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado, a court case that is going to be heard by the Supreme Court of the United States. The gist of it is that a gay couple came into a cakeshop to order a wedding cake for their wedding, and the baker refused to do so on the basis that it required them to in some way participate in or advocate for same sex marriage, which opposed their religious beliefs. This, then, was seen to violate Colorado’s anti-discrimination laws, and thus we have the court case.
Let me start by talking about what the right to freedom of religion is meant to do. While there are numerous different ways to phrase it, the basic, underlying idea is that the state cannot impose an excessive legal burden on one’s religious requirements. The reason for this is that it would effectively make it illegal for someone to practice their religion, and if the government can do that then no one has freedom of religion. While people like, say, Coel insist that this only applies to making it directly illegal, all anti-discriminatory legislation makes it clear that it doesn’t become non-discriminatory if it is unintentional. Part of the reason for that is that it is too easy to cast legislation as being universal while knowing that it will disproportionately impact a specific group. Another part is that the effects of the legislation aren’t in any way ameliorated by those effects being unintentional. At the heart of the right to freedom of religion is that I must not be required to choose between following the law and following my religious beliefs.
Of course, since we are dealing with entire societies and a host of rights, things are never that simple. We always have to balance the needs of the overall society and with the rights of others, and sometimes one right or the other has to give way. The key to this discussion — and thus is something that most people on both sides refuse to acknowledge — is that this is a clash between two rights, and even of two rights to non-discrimination: does the law’s requirement that the baker bake the cake unduly burden that baker wrt religion and thus constitutes discrimination on the basis of religion, or is the baker’s refusal to bake that cake discrimination against gay people?
Seidensticker starts by summarizing and/or commenting on the baker’s case, so I’ll start there as well, mostly by looking at his comments on the arguments.
The Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF) is the attorney for the baker, and it characterizes the case this way:
When a cake artist declines to design a cake for a Halloween party, the world goes about its business. But if that same cake artist declines a request for a custom cake for a same-sex wedding, he is forced to defend his decision all the way to the United States Supreme Court.
You act like this is surprising. The baker breaks no law (by refusing to serve no protected class of people) when he declines to bake a Halloween cake, but he refuses to serve homosexuals, who are protected by Colorado law, when he declines their wedding cake. When he has a place of public accommodation (like a storefront) in Colorado and refuses to serve someone in a protected class, he breaks the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act.
While it’s not a strong legal or philosophical argument, the oddity here is that if the baker decided that he didn’t like those people, or thought they were ugly, or didn’t like what they were wearing, he’d have an inarguable right to refuse to bake the cake for him. However, if he decided not to bake that cake for them because of his religious beliefs, then that becomes unacceptable and has to be justified. The thing is, religious beliefs are protected, and so the law should certainly find those reasons more justifiable than the previous ones given. And yet, in this case the argument is that they don’t. Of course, the real issue here is the one that Seidensticker notes: homosexuals are also a protected group, and so you wouldn’t be allowed to discriminate against them if that was your reason. Thus, if it was any other reason that the person didn’t want to bake a case for a same sex marriage specifically because it was for a same sex marriage, it clearly wouldn’t be allowed. Thus, it is sufficient to say that we are taking the right to freedom of religion more seriously here just by being willing to ask the question if the baker’s religious beliefs here might be sufficient to allow them to discriminate in this manner.
The ADF says, “The government does not have the power to force creative professionals like Jack—or anyone for that matter—to celebrate events that violate their faith.”
You don’t want to bake a cake for a same-sex wedding? Then don’t bake wedding cakes. Problem solved—now your faith is no longer violated. But if you provide public accommodation, which in this case means declaring to the public that you will sell custom wedding cakes, you can’t discriminate against protected classes.
The argument of “If you don’t like it, then don’t provide that service at all” is a very shaky one when it comes to rights. If someone is forced to not provide a service or enter into a field of employment only because the law says that they have to do something that would violate their religious beliefs, then we really should look into this closer, because this is precisely what the right to religious freedom is supposed to prevent. Sure, required services might be justified, but you need strong reasons — and, to use Seidensticker’s terminology (from later) — strong harms to say to all members of a specific religion “If you enter X field or perform X service you will have to choose between the law and your religion”. The idea of “public accommodation” cannot be used to exclude members of a specific religion — who thus would have specific religious obligations — from the public sphere unduly. So Seidensticker cannot blithely insist that public accommodation must, by necessity and in all cases, trump religious freedom, or else he risks allowing religions to be pushed from the public sphere because of major religious obligations on their part that clash with minor freedoms on the part of other protected groups, which would violate the reason we have the right to freedom of religion.
The ADF concludes, “[Baker Jack Phillips] has taken a bold stand for his faith—and for religious freedom for all of us.”
Religious freedom for all of us? We all want to be able to discriminate based on our personal religious beliefs? Sorry, laws trump your religious preferences when they conflict.
No, they don’t. The right to religious freedom — as is true for any Constitutionally protected right — exists for the sole purpose of being able to trump laws when their effect is to violate that right. For freedom of religion, that means the right to practice one’s religion as one sees fit, and thus to fulfill all of your religious obligations and to never violate your religion’s commands. A law that makes you violate a religious command or stops you from fulfilling a religious obligation is one that the right to freedom of religion exists to overturn.
He says he would refuse to create a cake with a hateful message or one that promoted racism, but the excuse that he wants for himself would allow a lot of collateral damage. If Jack can say that his religious beliefs forbid him from making a wedding cake that supports a same-sex wedding, another Christian baker can use the same logic to refuse a cake that supports a mixed-race wedding. In fact, if you think the multi-purpose Bible can’t be used to support a case against any of the protected classes listed in that law, including Jews, Muslims, and African-Americans, you haven’t read enough of the Bible. Worse, there’s no need to invent contrary biblical arguments because the logic behind the argument is irrelevant when religious beliefs are simply whatever someone says they are.
The problem is that as soon as you have any right like the right to freedom of religion and/or have religious groups as a protected class, you have the issue of deciding both what counts as a religion and what counts and religious obligations, commitments, and practices. Unless Seidensticker wants to eliminate that entirely — like Coel does — that ship has already sailed. And as it turns out, religious beliefs, in general, are not just whatever someone says they are. For almost all religions — except exceptionally small ones — we have access to experts on what those are: the ministers themselves. Often we have explicit doctrinal statements as well. And all of this should be obvious, because all religions are certainly going to want to and actually are going to have to make it clear to their congregations what their religious practices and beliefs are so that, well, they can do them. Any religion that couldn’t state these things clearly enough to be judged in a court of law for cases like this would lose those protections, just because of the objection Seidensticker raises: the state would have no way to determine if something was a religious obligation or something invented just to allow them to perform that action. Fortunately, that isn’t the case for almost all religions.
And the key here is not to look at the Bible and see that you can justify various things, because the Bible is not what’s being protected here, nor is any specific interpretation of it being protected. No, what happens in these cases is that a person says that they are a member of an officially recognized religion and that their religion’s interpretation of whatever relevant texts and philosophies they use says that to take that action would be a violation of their religious beliefs. Then we can look at the religion and texts and interpretations in general to see if that holds water.
This brings us to the key things to argue over here. In this case, he is saying that his religious beliefs forbid him from participating in and/or advocating for same sex marriage, and that baking the cake means that he’d be participating in and/or advocating for same sex marriage. You can attack this two ways, by pointing out that his religious beliefs don’t forbid him from doing that, or that baking the cake cannot reasonably be seen as participating. Not serving same sex couples pretty much falls under the “You aren’t participating” line, but that isn’t as clear here, but in general these are thing that we can indeed judge on the basis of the logic behind the argument. Seidensticker wants to dismiss any such attempts out of hand when it comes to religion, but there isn’t a really good argument for doing so, especially since we have been doing it for hundreds of years and are required to try if we want to have any meaningful freedom of religion at all.
Note the novel part of this case. The exemption for discrimination isn’t being asked for all businesses, just those that involve “artistic expression.” Artistic expression is speech, and the first amendment protects that as well as religion.
Making a cake is artistic expression, but this claim can apply (potentially) to lots of businesses: florists, nail salons, barbers, tailors, carpenters, plumbers, or destinations for kids’ birthday parties. Maybe even guidance counselors, funeral homes, therapists, or doctors. And once the door is open a bit, other businesses that can’t claim an artistic expression exemption might push for a piece of that sweet, sweet discrimination action.
This is an argument akin to “If you allow same sex marriages, you have to allow polygamous ones as well”. First, that isn’t necessarily the case, as we can appeal back to the “participation” angle as well. To take nail salons, the reason that someone wants their nails done isn’t relevant to the service itself, and so doesn’t count as participating, nor is there likely to be anything about the nail service itself that would express a statement that might violate their religious beliefs. That may not be true of the cake, especially if they, say, want to insist on having two grooms at the top of it. Suffice it to say that we can probably distinguish the legitimate ones from the illegitimate ones, and if the case holds the legitimate ones are indeed ones where we should recognize the artistic expression angle, and the illegitimate ones are the ones where we wouldn’t.
First Amendment rights are important. When the Christian doesn’t have the right to speak freely on religion, I probably don’t, either. But religious freedom doesn’t give you the right to impose your beliefs on others.
But how is the baker, here, imposing their beliefs on others? They are refusing to do one acting that violates their own personal religious beliefs, which are protected just as much as the same sex couple’s rights are. It does seem to me that forcing someone to participate in a service or express a message that violates their religious beliefs is far more imposing beliefs than saying “You can get someone else to bake you a cake but I won’t”.
And that’s the key and why I said above that most people on both sides don’t really get the debate. The religious side tends to argue on the basis that they have a right to their religious beliefs and ignores that there is another right on the other side to consider. But as seen here the secularists like Seidensticker tend to ignore that people have a right to their religious beliefs and that other people and the law have no right to insist that they act against their religious beliefs. When we get a clash like this, we need to consider the rights of both sides and determine what action to take, or even if there is a compromise position. This is what most of the debate is studiously ignoring.
In his second post, Seidensticker summarizes the FFRF response. The first point:
The freedom of thought and belief—freedom of conscience—is absolute. But the freedom to act on religious beliefs in every circumstance of one’s life is not absolute, and religious conduct can and must be burdened by civil laws, especially those that protect the rights of others.
Yes, it is not absolute. But that doesn’t mean that it can be burdened by civil laws willy-nilly. The state must have a compelling, neutral argument for why it needs that law and why it needs to extend it to those religious practices. If it can achieve its end without burdening religious conduct, the right says that they must do so. When it comes to a clash of rights, then we must consider which violation of rights is the more severe, and choose the option that violates the rights the least severely. The right to freedom of religion ends at the rights of other citizens … but so does the right to non-discrimination or, indeed, any other right.
The baker claims that both Hobby Lobby and Masterpiece Cakeshop are closely held family businesses, so the conclusion in the Hobby Lobby case—that this kind of business can itself hold a religious belief that would exempt it from regulations—applies to Masterpiece Cakeshop as well.
The FFRF brief rejects this claim. The Hobby Lobby case was interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), a federal statute, and didn’t touch on First Amendment claims. Since the opposite is true in the Masterpiece Cakeshop case—it relies on a First Amendment claim and isn’t affected by RFRA—Hobby Lobby is no precedent.
This part seems aimed to show that the religious beliefs of the baker are relevant to the service provided, and is not an argument that the two should be considered the same and so if Hobby Lobby won then the baker here should win as well. It just establishes that his connection to his business is direct enough that his beliefs are relevant to what services he provides.
What’s the difference between racial discrimination based on religious beliefs and racial discrimination not based on religious beliefs? There’s no way to distinguish them. Said another way, imagine discrimination that is falsely claimed to be based on religious belief. How could anyone reliably detect the lie?
To make such a claim, you must be able to identify what religion you are and what obligations you have because of that religion clearly enough to evaluate whether the action really would violate your religious beliefs. Once you do so, any lie could be detected reliably enough.
The baker attempts to make a distinction between refusing to sell a wedding cake that celebrates a gay wedding and refusing to sell a wedding cake to gay people. The only people having gay weddings are gay people, and you can’t discriminate against the wedding without discriminating against the people.
It is possible for someone who is not gay to be purchasing the cake for that wedding. Presumably, the baker here wouldn’t sell it to that person either, so it really is that the cake is for a specific event, and not just that the customer is gay. So, yes, you can indeed distinguish between participating in an event and selling to a specific person. That the couple is gay only comes into play here because of the fact that the event itself ties into homosexuality, but it’s not a case of people vs event here. The event is specifically homosexual and so using that reason triggers that protected group, but it’s not the people in general that we are concerned about here, but the event itself.
Bob Jones Sr., televangelist and founder of his self-named university, infamously preached in his 1960 Easter sermon, “If you are against segregation and against racial separation, then you are against God.”
The university forbade mixed-race marriages, flouting a 1970 IRS (Internal Revenue Service) regulation that prohibited tax-exempt status for private schools with racially discriminatory policies, and the IRS revoked their tax-exempt status (ah, for the good old days!). The 1983 SCOTUS decision supported the IRS and concluded, “Governmental interest substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioners’ exercise of their religious beliefs.”
Which to me sounds like a specific argument that in this case losing their tax-exempt status was not a sufficient burden to their university when balanced against the need for the government to not be funding racially discriminatory practices. Here, this isn’t a clear. The harm done to a same sex couple for having to get their cake somewhere else is pretty negligible, and from the societal view not forcing people to express messages that oppose their religious beliefs seems stronger than having same sex couples mildly disadvantaged in service of that.
Seidensticker has a concluding thought:
There’s an implied asymmetry in the baker’s favor. Religious views are considered fundamental, an important part of someone’s makeup. Those views are fixed, and it’d be much easier for the customer to take his request down the street to another baker than insist that the baker compromise his religious views.
But let’s question that. Instead of the customer going down the street to another baker, why can’t the baker go down the street to another church? Christians change congregations by the thousands every day. There’s nothing inherently wrong about same-sex weddings within Christianity. The baker can drop his bias and still be a Christian.
Yes, let’s say that if the baker doesn’t want to have the law burden his religious beliefs, he really ought to just change religions. Avoiding that is the entire purpose the right to freedom of religion exists. The law cannot make some religions legally superior to others. That violates both freedom of religion and the establishment clause. And Seidensticker cannot be so obtuse as to not understand that different sects of Christianity count as different religions. Forced conversion to more state-friendly religions on pain of legal punishment is not something that you can support and still claim to have anything like freedom of religion.
Philosophically, we definitely have to consider this case as one where allowing the baker to refuse might be reasonable. The key is over whether or not it counts as participation or as expressing that view. However, neither side really seems to want to debate that, and instead wants to insist that their right trumps the rights of the other side. I wonder why that is …
First Move Advantage …
December 6, 2017So, as I promised elsewhere, this is another post taking on a post by Extra Credits. This time in a video from three years ago they’re talking about “First Move Advantage”, they are talking about “First Move Advantage”, which is when in a turn-based game — or in a turn-based element of a game — the person moving first gets a turn up on their opponent and so has an advantage over their opponent. They treat this like it is inherent, but I submit that there is no such thing as an inherent advantage to the first player and that if you are noticing this in your metrics the problem is likely with how your game is structured.
As usual, I can’t copy-and-paste quote directly from the video, so let me summarize their argument. This video follows on from a previous video — that I haven’t watched — about randomness in E-sports, which spawns this new discussion, even though it isn’t focused on E-sports (I’ll talk more about E-sports later). They start by giving examples of games that have had or are at least believed to have significant first move advantage, and talk about ways they went about trying to compensate for that. It is interesting to note that these compensations are, in general, not a matter of tweaking rules but are instead about giving direct and generally external to the game advantages to the second player, like giving more cards to a Magic player or more points to the Go player who goes last. They then talk about ways to detect and compensate for this if you’re designing a game, hitting topics like having metrics in the game to determine if it is happening and how significant it is to being aware that it might get worse over time as players get better at the game and exploit it more. At the end of the day, their main point is to ensure that designers are aware of and compensate for first move advantage in turn-based games and in games that have turn-based elements.
The problem is that moving first isn’t always an advantage, even in the “developed resource” games that they talk about, and is only a significant advantage if the game design is built to give an advantage to what the first mover gains from moving first at the expense of what the second player gains from moving second.
The first thing we need to do to see this more clearly is generalize away from a simple two-player turn-based game and thus from the simplistic “First move vs last move” mechanic to “Early move vs late move”. This allows us to look at other turn-based, multiplayer games like Civilization, Disciples 2, Master of Orion and a host of others, including tabletop games like Dungeons and Dragons. What we can see, then, is that if you move first you get initiative — you even roll for that in D & D — and if you move later you have to be reactive. But that also means that you get to react to what your opponent is doing. You can see what units they are creating, who they are attacking, what their formation is and adjust accordingly. So the advantage to going earlier in the turn is that you get to enact your strategy before your opponent does, but the advantage to going later in the turn is that your opponents’ strategy is revealed to you before yours is to them. In some games, that initial strategy can be revealed as early as the first turn.
We can see how this works with a D & Dish example. Imagine that there is one character who, due to their level or class or whatever, has an overwhelming ability that will mostly win the battle for them, but activating it reduces their initiative so they have to go last. The first player can — and obviously will — try to pull out all the stops in trying to kill it before it can be activated. If they succeed, then they probably steamroll the rest of the team and win the fight. But if they fail, they pretty much lose the battle. Knowing this and seeing the first player positioning for this move and/or even starting the attacks, the second player can do things to add to the survivability of that character, like using other characters to heal it or to intercept attacks so that it can survive and win the battle for them. If the first player doesn’t, in fact, make this sort of focused move, the second player can then take other actions to bolster their advantage and doesn’t have to focus on protecting that character as much (which isn’t all that great if the ability is hugely, hugely overwhelming, but in closer battles it can be critical). The first player will get to do some damage first, but as long as that damage isn’t inherently overwhelming the second player gets to react to that strategy. Heck, they might even be able to plan for that character being wiped out and position themselves with an overwhelming advantage considering that, if the game is sufficiently balanced, using that character as a decoy.
An example of this is shown in this Order of the Stick comic. The monster gets to attack first, but whomever it attacks the other cleric simply heals that damage. They don’t need to try to heal any specific character until they know who has actually lost hit points. Sure, if this pattern continues eventually the monster will win because they will run out of heal spells, but that assumes that that’s all they do. If they attack at all, then it comes down to whether or not they can kill the monster because it does enough damage to run them out of heal spells.
And this leads us to another way the later turn advantage plays out, with the later player never having to waste resources — or additional resources — trying to do something that won’t have benefit them because of what the other player has or hasn’t done. Take the healing case. If you have to specify that you will cast a healing spell but have to wait for your casting time, it is possible that when your turn comes up no one has been damaged yet, and so the spell is useless at this point in the turn, even if it would have been useful later. Meanwhile, the character with the later turn is pretty much guaranteed to be able to heal someone that turn, even if it isn’t the optimal person to heal, so they can be more comfortable casting the spell without risking wasting it. The same thing can apply to Wonders in a game like Civilization. If they find out that another player is building a Wonder and will finish it first, the player reacting to this can stop putting resources into building it and can shift the ones already allocated to build something else useful, even a different Wonder. Now, this isn’t as pure an example of early vs late turn advantage because in Civilization this depends a lot on how productive the various cities are, which doesn’t depend quite as much on who goes first (it depends more on what is around you and where you plant your cities) but there is a bit of that here. All other things being equal — which they aren’t — the early players will build Wonders first but later players will get to react to being beaten to the punch.
And this ability to react can have advantages. The early turn player has to wait longer for their opponent’s strategy to become clear, so they have to guess at what is a good move more often. Take this example: there are two resources that an early player can or wants to acquire. The best one also happens to be close to another player who moves later, and who could get it before them if they went after it. The further one isn’t as good, but they could get it before anyone else if they started for it immediately, but might not if they don’t. None of the players can know what resource another player is trying for until they make that first move. For the early turn player, they have to guess at what their opponents are going to do. Do they see that resource? Are they occupied with something else that will prevent them from interfering? If they decide to play it safe, they get a resource but not the one they really wanted. If they don’t, then they might get neither.
Meanwhile, the later turn player merely has to watch and wait to see what the early turn player actually does. If they move towards that resource, the later turn player can immediately move out towards it and deny it to them. If they move for the other resource, they can either take that resource anyway or else take the opportunity to do other things secure in the knowledge that no one will be able to take that resource without them being able to react in time. The early player is in a tough situation here, because being able to react to their moves first can leave them in a terrible situation.
So we can see that we can have early turn and later turn advantage. You’ll tend to have early turn advantage when being able to enact your strategy first will give you more advantage than being able to react to your strategies first does, while later turn advantage occurs when the opposite is true.
But just as if your game is imbalanced as players improve they will find ways to exploit it, if your game is actually balanced as players improve they will find ways to mitigate an early perceived advantage. A game might start with early or later turn players having the advantage, but as the players develop this might balance out. An example of this is with an RTS, Starcraft, and “Zerg Rushing”. Basically, the Zerg faction was built to produce a lot of cheap units really quickly, and so a main strategy was to crank out a tonne of these and send them to the nearest enemy base, wiping it out. I’m not a Starcraft expert, but I understand that players here learned that this was a possibility and learned ways to counter that, making that early advantage less of one. So an advantage to either early or later turns in a game might get eliminated as players learn those strategies and develop effective counters.
Of course, it’s always possible that a game really does have an early or later turn advantage. Rather than simply giving benefits, it’s probably a good idea to look at your rules to see what is causing the problem. If there is a significant and consistent early turn advantage, the issue is that initiative matters more than being able to react, which usually means that either the opponents don’t have effective counters to strategies or can’t figure out what strategies the early turn players have before it is too late to counter them. For later turn advantage, it usually means that the strategies are too obvious and the counters too easy to implement. All of these can be tweaked to reduce or even eliminate the advantage.
But after all of this it might indeed still be the case that the advantage cannot be eliminated without changing the game so radically that it isn’t the same game anymore and might not even be fun anymore if you did so. What do you do if you want some kind of formal competitive structure, like ranked PvP or E-sports? Well, for actual competitions, instead of giving random point or card advantages or other external to the game corrections, you can do what other competitive sports have done. Both tennis and darts have huge advantages to one player. In tennis, the player with serve wins most of the time, while in darts the player who has the throw — ie throws darts first — has a huge advantage (and that is indeed because they get to enact their “strategy” first by usually getting the first chance to throw for a “finish” and win the game). Yet both have strong competitive leagues. How do they resolve the problem? They alternate serve/throw, and force a player to win “by two”, meaning that if a player wants to win a match they have to break serve or break throw, meaning that they have to beat their opponent at least once when their opponent has the advantage to win the match. If the advantage is huge and the players equally balanced, this can take a while, but even with the massive advantage for those sports this rarely happens. And any game with luck elements will want to have the players play a series rather than simply one match, so this isn’t hard to fit into most competitive structures, and avoids the rather odd looking “balance” options given in the video.
In summary, there is no inherent early turn or first move advantage. Early turn players get initiative and to enact their strategies first, while later turn players get to react to those strategies first. A game can advantage either of these, and if you find that a game advantages one or the other understanding the advantages of going first or going last can help you balance it. And if you have a game that can’t be balanced but that you want to have in competitions anyway, forcing a player to win “against the throw” is a way to keep it balanced and exciting without introducing artificial, outside-the-rules balancing mechanisms.
Posted in Not-So-Casual Commentary, Video Games | Leave a Comment »