So, over at his own blog, Coel has recently posted a post taking on an article by Susan Haack arguing that science needs philosophy for justification, at least. Coel is a notorious scientismist, and so will obviously take umbrage to that argument. What is interesting is that that post of his was posted less than a week after I posted my post on how science may not be trustworthy and that it needs to do some things more philosophically in order to avoid making the mistakes it tends to make, meaning that the two posts, completely independently, take directly opposing views on science, its reliability, and how science and philosophy need to proceed. I made a comment there pointing out some of the issues I raised in my post, but here I’d like to go through Coel’s post directly and respond to some of his comments.
Let me start here:
The second claim, though, is that where science is limited in scope, other “ways of knowing”, such as philosophy, can arrive at reliable knowledge. It is this second claim, not the first, that scientism denies.
(It’s also worth pointing out that advocates of scientism intend a broad definition of science that includes rational analysis as much as empirical data, and thus encompasses modes of enquiry that others might regard as outside science.)
As I’m sure I’ve pointed out to him before, this expansion of the definition of science is essentially cheating. It’s pretty easy to justify a claim that science is the only way of knowing if anything else that ever produced any form of knowledge gets counted as science. This move is made even worse by the fact that philosophy has a far better claim to that mantle than science does, since it can do pretty much every method ever done — including strict empirical science — while science has more restrictions on its methodology, as Coel himself concedes. If the scientismist’s definition of science is so expansive that it includes philosophy and all other possible ways of knowing into it, then it’s probably not a good definition … and, in fact, doing so makes the question of whether or not philosophy is a way of knowing or can arrive at reliable knowledge as well as science does meaningless, since philosophy itself would be science by that definition, not matter what methodology it was using.
So Coel can’t “cheat” by redefining science any time anything else manages to find out something. He needs to have a solid definition of science and the scientific method and what that entails and implies, and what assumptions it makes, that we can use to distinguish other potential ways of knowing from science so we can evaluate if they exist and if they can work. If he just wants to expand the definition to include all possible ways of knowing in science, then I’ll adopt philosophism and insist that the only way of knowing is philosophy, and have the stronger justification that science was originally philosophy and that none of its methods or conclusions are ones that philosophy could not use or arrive at.
Coel’s big justification for science boils down to a claim of “it works”:
I consider it to be fundamentally wrong. Scientists don’t look to philosophers to justify their subject, they consider that science is justified because it works. And by “works” we mean that it leads to predictions of eclipses that come true, it leads to medicines that can cure people, it leads to accounts of reality that demonstrably contain understanding of the world. This is best demonstrated by technology. Computers work, iPhones work, aircraft fly, MRI scanners work.
Science can use its most esoteric theories to predict the existence of gravitational waves emitted by colliding neutron stars or black holes — both exotic concepts far beyond the world of everyday experience — and then build hugely complex machines of impressive technological mastery to detect such waves, and then use them to observe exactly what was predicted, complete with the characteristic in-spiral pattern.
Further the methods of science are not the product of philosophy but are themselves the product of science. By that, I mean that the methods of science are the product of experimentation, trying out different approaches and seeing what works best.
The problem is that if the methodology of science was really nothing more than “trying out different approaches and seeing what works best”, science would never have produced all of those wonderful things that he waxes eloquently about here. That methodology is the hallmark of what I have in the past called “everyday reasoning” but now will call “folk reasoning”, which is how most people reason most of the time. It generally takes empirical observations, forms rough and loose theories about what they mean, which is then used to make basic predictions about what will happen if you take a specific action. It tends to use a rough inductive approach as well, assuming that if something has always occurred, it will keep occurring. If its predictions turn out to be wrong, it adjusts its beliefs doing as little damage to the overall web of beliefs as possible, and continues on. It also tends to only test for confirming evidence and not disconfirming evidence, as seen in the Wason card task. As such, it can hold on to false beliefs for a long time, through being able to adjust the web of belief to accommodate it and the new data/beliefs, and through not testing the disconfirming cases to see if it really holds. However, for the most part this “works”, as we get a web of belief that we can use to navigate our every day lives and achieve our goals without too much difficulty.
So how does at least formal science differ? Science rejects the simple induction of folk reasoning in favour of the hypothetico deductive method, where instead of merely gathering empirical data and generalizing using ad hoc theories it builds an entire hypothesis that it justifies using deductive logic, insisting that if the premises of the hypothesis are true then the conclusion must be true. Thus, what it does is build not merely a hypothesis for what it has observed, but more importantly an explanation for what it has observed. And it doesn’t stop there. Since it has this deductively justified hypothesis/explanation, it can trace out the consequences of that hypothesis and then actively seek to disconfirm it (ie falsify it), which then allows it to find false beliefs or hypotheses earlier and then adjust appropriately. A good example of how the two methods differ is the old “The Sun rises in the east” example. For folk reasoning, the fact that the Sun has always risen in the east is sufficient to justify the claim that tomorrow it will rise in the east. For science, that’s not sufficient, because of the inductive fallacy; just because it has always done so doesn’t mean that it will indeed do so in the future. So science instead finds the explanation for why the Sun rises in the east: it’s because of the Earth’s rotation. Because of this, it knows that as long as the Sun exists and the Earth keeps rotating like it does, the Sun will rise in the east. Both methods work, in that they predict that the Sun will rise in the east every day, and lo and behold it does. But the scientific approach is much more robust and is more reliable.
Folk reasoning is less reliable, but is faster for simple claims, which is why it is what we use most of the time, and is reliable enough to work out. Science is more reliable, but also far slower if it’s being done properly. Philosophy is even slower because it is more skeptical and keeps challenging even the base principles that the ideas and explanations are based on. In theory, all of these methods could arrive at all true propositions eventually — putting aside certain underlying assumptions, which is more prevalent in science than the other two — but we can see that each method is best suited for certain questions. Folk reasoning works for questions that are directly empirical, where 100% reliability isn’t required, and when you need an answer quickly. Science works best for empirical questions that have consequences that extend beyond the actual question, or where being right is more important. Philosophy works best for questions where you aren’t really sure what approach to take or that are about basic underpinnings of things like experience or methodologies, because it’s not bound to any set of assumptions or methodologies. All of these are useful and can produce knowledge in their own way.
Coel, as usual, underestimates just how radically different science is and just how important those differences are to science’s success in his zeal to define science as the only way of knowing. In so doing, he ends up making science a pale shell of itself, and also imports failures into the method that he reveres for getting things mostly right.
If science necessarily adopts assumptions A, B and C, and then science built on such assumptions works in the real world (“works” in the above sense), then that demonstrates that assumptions A, B and C are real-world true. In other words, A, B and C are no longer assumptions but have now been tested and validated by the fact that adopting them works.
(If one wants to retort that, while science assumes A, B and C, it doesn’t actually test them because it could instead adopt P, Q and R, without any resulting change to observations, then this would mean that A, B and C were not necessary assumptions, and thus that they are not key underpinnings of science.)
This isn’t true, though. I’ll make a philosophical point here, and note that it may be a key underpinning of science — or, at least, scientists may assume it is such — that A, B and C are the case but that it is not necessary for science to do so. The example I’ll use here is the naturalistic assumption, the idea that all answers about the world will be natural ones. Many scientists like Coel assume this, and it is argued that this is a fundamental assumption of science. It will also be claimed that this assumption generally works, as all of the explanations science has discovered in the past have been natural, and science has had success in overturning supernatural claims and replacing them with natural explanations. But I would reply that it is unnecessary to do so, and even potentially detrimental to science as a way of knowing to do so. If the natural explanation really is the truth, then the evidence and methods of science should be able to make that clear. If it isn’t, then simply assuming a natural explanation is more likely to be true isn’t the right approach; at best, your knowledge here would be strongly, strongly provisional and dependent on future investigation and evidence, and so might be proven wrong at any time. This only gets worse if the determination is that supernatural explanations are so improbable that any natural explanation is to be preferred, like that someone is either lying or hallucinating for no other reason than that their experience would mean that the supernatural explanation is true. If all experiences of the supernatural are dismissed because they would support supernatural claims which are assumed to be false because all true explanations are assumed to be natural, then science will never accept a supernatural explanation … even if that is the one that turns out to be true. The only way around this blind spot would be to weaken the assumption of naturalism … and the best way to do that would be to eliminate it entirely.
There have been attempts to justify the naturalistic assumption, but all of them end up being philosophical arguments even by Coel’s standard, because they cannot appeal to “it works” as a justification, because science with the naturalistic assumption and science without the naturalistic assumption would, in fact, both work equally well. And, in fact, one of the problems with simply relying on “it works” as a justification is that there is no principled way to differentiate between two methods or theories that both work equally well in predicting the existing empirical data but are radically different. Even appealing to things like parsimony end up either being unjustified or requiring philosophical justifications, because “it works” can’t differentiate the claims sufficiently.
So, yes, you can have assumptions that are fundamental to science but that are not necessary for science. Unless Coel wants to drop all of those from science, he’ll need a philosophical argument to justify why science should retain them.
Thus Haack’s claim that, without philosophy, science would be “adrift with no rational anchoring” is misconceived. Science is not founded on “rational anchoring”, that is, reasoning from key axioms that can be known a priori (and nor is it founded on axioms that can only be taken on faith). Indeed, it can’t be, because philosophy has no way of arriving at a priori knowledge.
Instead, science is an iteration between a whole web of ideas and models, and the comparison of that web of ideas to the real world that we experience empirically through our senses. Science is not anchored in philosophy, it is instead anchored in the empirical world and justified by the fact that it works; that is, by the fact that the ensemble web explains the real world, enables us to make good predictions about the real world, and enables us to develop technology that works.
Well, how does Coel know that philosophy can’t arrive at any kind of a priori knowledge? Also, why does Coel assume that philosophy can’t use empirical data and “what works” as much as science can? When philosophers reject empirical approaches as a way to answer a question, they aren’t doing it because empiricism is icky or anything, but because as they analyze the question they note that empirical data’s not going to answer it. Coel continually denies philosophy any kind of method that he wants to claim works, and then chides philosophy for not being able to find out what works in the real world. This is not a reasonable move, and so philosophers ought not accept it.
To Susan Haack’s suggestion that: “none of the sciences could tell us whether, and if so, why, science has a legitimate claim to give us knowledge of the world”, the reply is that it demonstrably works, and that since it does, that shows that it has a legitimate claim on knowledge (since that’s what “knowledge of the world” ultimately means).
To quote a professor I had once: Says who? Why should we accept that “knowledge of the world” ultimately means “what works”, especially given how in at least limited circumstances false beliefs can work. And who says that we can’t derive truths about the world without having to test it against the world? Heck, what does he even mean by world here? All of these are philosophical questions that Coel is assuming answers to and then insisting that he has justified them by “it works” when all of those assumptions could be false and yet still work.
And it is a good thing that science is not anchored in philosophy, since philosophy itself has no way of justifying its tenets. Contra Haack, the problem would be if science did depend on philosophy, rather than justifying itself by a boot-strap iteration with empirical reality. Because we’d then have no way of establishing whether it had any more validity than other “ways of knowing”.
Again, who says that philosophy can’t and hasn’t use that same boot-strap of empirical reality? In fact, it already had done so, which is what led to science existing in the first place. Philosophy only rejects appealing to empirical reality when an examination of the question reveals that you can’t appeal to empirical reality to answer the question. Coel repeatedly either assumes answers to those questions and then justifies them by an appeal to empirical reality that can’t justify those answers or else dismisses the questions as at best uninteresting. But that doesn’t mean that he’s really answered them, or that his method can answer them, or that the answers to those questions can’t be known. He’d need philosophy to do that … and that’s what he continually refuses to acknowledge while still insisting that his philosophizing isn’t, and that he’s really doing science.
Whatever science is to him. Which is another philosophical question he’d probably want to answer and justify at some point …
Your chance to help decide what I write about!
November 29, 2017So, I’ve been running with the three updates a week schedule for quite a while now, and it seems to be working out pretty well. It even managed to survive my incredible busy time without all that much of a hitch. In doing this I’ve also started to figure out what things work, what things don’t and how things can work out better in my schedule, which then might start to make the blog more
predictableconsistent in how things work and what sort of content you might see here. In short, there are certain types of content that work pretty well whether I’m busy or not, and that are also things that I like talking about and am going to do some things with anyway, so I might as well talk about them.The key is that what works best for the blog are things that I can watch, read or do at any time and then comment on later without having to refer back to the original source material that much. If I can do that, then it really makes my blog writing more flexible and so gives me things that can be done in a relative hurry if I’m busy but that I can do in free time if I’m not busy. TV shows are the ideal for this, and books are probably the worst (since to comment on arguments fairly I generally want to quote from them). But since a lot of these things are things that I haven’t focused on or that are suddenly fitting into my schedule better than they did before, I’m also a bit short of things that fit into those categories and so need to find some new sources for those sorts of posts.
Here is your chance to guide me towards new things to try in those areas.
So, one thing that I’ve found myself lately is watching Extra Credits youtube videos and commenting on them (which in their case means “Disagreeing with them”). In fact, I’m planning on commenting on another couple of them in the near future. But other than SF Debris, I don’t really watch a lot of youtube videos, especially when it comes to gaming. And about the only other commentator on games that I read consistently is Shamus Young, and I’m thinking about digging through his old columns — which he is planning on revisting himself, making this so much easier — to find some other things to talk about. But what other video game commentators do you guys like to watch or read who might have things to say that I might find interesting and want to talk about? While ones that I would probably disagree with are in some sense good — because it’s always pretty easy to write posts disagreeing with people (Hi, Extra Credits!) — I’m also open to people who just say things that might bring up interesting, tangentially related ideas for me to talk about (Hi, Shamus!).
A couple of caveats, though: for youtube videos, the videos can’t be longer, on average, than a half-hour, and can’t be Let’s Plays. Text reviewers are not only excluded from those restrictions, they’ll get precedence because it’s easier for me to read them anywhere and quote them if I want to talk about what they’re saying.
Another thing that I’ve recently started doing more frequently is commenting on TV shows that I’m watching in general, which you saw with Sabrina the Teenage Witch, Transformers, and most recently Cheers. I’m currently watching Frasier, and will talk about it as things go along, and I still have a show like Wings waiting when this is done. But since I don’t watch a lot of TV in general, I don’t have much of an idea of what shows might be worth watching, and for my purposes — see the upcoming caveats — don’t want to risk trying something out that I don’t think will be good.
Right now, there are a number of caveats. First, for at least the next year it looks like half-hour shows are what I’ll be watching, and that’s all that I could do for the blog because it would take me too long to watch hourly shows to be useful for generating content on the blog. However, that isn’t limited to sitcoms, as it can fit into anything that is half-hour in length and sounds interesting, like cartoons (for example). Second, these have to be completed series, and it has to be the case that I can get the entire series for a reasonable price. Ideally, if I can order them all on amazon.ca, that would be wonderful. EDIT: I’ll pretty much be buying DVDs, so if it’s not out on DVD the chances of my watching it are slim to none. Third, they can’t be too long; the eleven seasons of Frasier and Cheers are probably about the limit, although that’s more number of episodes rather than number of seasons.
As an example, I’m right now looking to see if I can get Hot in Cleveland — which I’ve talked about before — and maybe, now that its run is done, 2 Broke Girls if I can get the seasons for a reasonable price. Big Bang Theory is out because it is still running and is too long anyway, as is something like The Simpsons for the same reason.
I’m also interested in getting suggestions for books to read and talk about. I do want to keep reading and writing about deeper and more serious topics like that, even though it takes me a while to get around to commenting on them (I have finished reading Philipse’s book, for example, but still have to finish writing posts about it), and I’m a bit out of the loop on what the most recent or, for some genres, even what the popular books and topics are. So I’d be looking for suggestions in the genres of theology, philosophy, and history primarily. I’ll also consider requests for TPB comic editions (but, at least for now, not Alt-Hero).
Now, just because something isn’t listed here doesn’t mean that I won’t be writing about it. For example, I still intend to write about video games, but that will still be limited to the ones I play, and I won’t be soliciting ones to consider as something new so I can talk about it on the blog. And I’ll talk about music and my own eccentricities and do song parodies and talk about computers and write philosophical posts regardless. It’s just that these are categories that it is both relatively easy for me to write about and that I’m fairly uninformed about what’s out there that I might want to get into and write about, which is why I’m asking for suggestions here.
Also note that this isn’t like Chuck’s requests. I don’t put these on a list and promise to have them completed at some time in the near future. I’ll do them if I feel like it and get time and can get them without breaking the bank. I’ll try to respond to all comments as to whether there’s even a chance of it and I’ll try to put something up for things that I’ve bought and so plan to get to at some point, but any suggestion you make here is a suggestion that I’ll consider but may not do, even if I think it’s a good one.
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