… he just keeps commenting on free will, insisting that his hard determinism stance is correct and that all other views, no matter how informed, are just plain misguided. So, an awful lot like his views on religion, to tell you the truth.
This time, he’s taking on a 2 minute spiel by Sean Carroll, a compatiblist about free will who was talked to a hard determinist, John Hamill. Hamill says that Carroll schooled him about free will, but since Coyne doesn’t like Carroll’s compatiblism — even as he likes much of the other things he said — Coyne felt the need to show that he really wasn’t. And one of the first things he takes exception to is this:
First of all, the difference between compatibilism (free will is compatible with determinism) and incompatibilism (free will is NOT compatible with determinism) really is semantic, despite what Sean says. When he says “nobody is offering new definitions,” he’s wrong. There are many new conceptions of free will being offered, all to support compatibilism (Dan Dennett has offered a couple, for example). But the different definitions are incompatible with each other! (Some say it’s “lack of coercion,” some say it’s “the complicated input into our brains”, and the list goes on.) Which concept of free will is “right”?
First, showing that there are differing conceptions of free will in no way demonstrates that the difference between compatiblism and incompatiblism is merely semantic. This can be far more easily seen if one recalls that libertarianism is an incompatiblist postion. It agrees with the hard determinist that you can’t have both free will and determinism — ie that “free will is NOT compatible with determinism”, as Coyne says — but thus concludes that that has to mean that determinism is false. That, of course, is not a merely semantic distinction. Now Coyne can reply that that might be the case, but that that doesn’t mean that there is anything other than a semantic difference between compatiblism and his hard determinism. But then the question can be raised over why compatiblism so bothers Coyne. If they are merely saying the same thing in different ways, then why should Coyne worry about it so much? I suppose he could argue that the implications of the words they do either give incorrect perceptions of the world — for example, by encouraging people to maintain dualistic notions instead of the deterministic ones Coyne favours — or else block off certain solutions that he favours, but it still seems odd to focus so much attention on it if it really is a mere semantic distinction as Coyne asserts.
Additionally, it doesn’t seem that the positions really are merely semantic, at least not in how Coyne generally goes about it. In general, compatiblist positions assert that conscious deliberation matters in determining the outcome of a choice, while hard determinists deny that. Coyne himself uses the results of experiments designed to show that conscious deliberation does not determine the outcome of a choice — like the Libet experiments — to argue just that. That’s not a mere semantic distinction. Compatiblists argue that the conscious choice-making process is just as determined as everything else is, not that it’s irrelevant, as Coyne tends to argue.
So either the positions have all the same implications and thus the difference really is merely semantic, or else there is a significant difference in the positions and so Coyne should be addressing that and stop treating it like a mere semantic difference.
But on top of that, offering new conceptions of free will does not mean that they are, in fact, offering new definitions. In general, we all pretty much know what sorts of phenomena we want to explain using free will, or at least that free will was an explanation for. That’s the definition of “free will”. But there are multiple ways to explain those phenomena, and so different people have different hypotheses about how that all works out. Taking the two examples Coyne explicitly gives, the idea that it means “lack of coercion” is not necessarily incompatible with “the complicated input into our brains”. At first glance, the latter looks like an idea about implementation while the former looks like a base requirement for a choice to be free without going into the full details of choosing. But even if they were, these are differing hypotheses aimed at explaining the same phenomena, each of which can be right or wrong (for example, I think that a “coerced” choice is a free choice, and that people who use that definition are conflating the legal notion of responsibility with the philosophical one). Essentially, Coyne’s argument here is like someone denying that there is any phenomena as Dark Matter because there are a number of competing and incompatible hypotheses trying to explain what it is. While ignoring, of course, that his is just one of them.
This also has an impact when dealing with the “folk” definition of free will:
The fact is that, in surveys, most people conceive of free will as dualistic (libertarian) free will: you really could have done otherwise at a given moment. That notion is of course incompatible with the laws of physics. Despite the ruminations of philosophers, that’s what the definition of free will IS to most people. And those people don’t think their choices are governed by the laws of physics. Shouldn’t we be telling them this? If you say “no”, I think you’re misguided.
This is really comparable to the evolutionary standard line of “Humans evolved from apes”, which is also a huge part of the folk definition of evolution. It also lends itself to the rather erroneous claim that “If humans evolved from apes, how come there are still apes?”. This is a bad argument because the folk definition is a useful analogy or simplified statement to get the point across, but those who study evolution in detail know how that gets fleshed out so that when we examine it in detail we know that there’s more to it than that simple principle.
The same thing applies to free will. Coyne loves to harp on the idea that free will really means the dualistic “Could have done otherwise”, but that’s a very simplified notion of what free will really means. What we mean by a free choice — meaning a choice chosen of one’s own free will — is that the choice is a product of our conscious decision-making processes, including but not limited to conscious deliberation. What’s important is that when someone sits down to make the hard decision about which university to attend, or which job to take, or whether to propose to their partner, those ruminations and debates that they have with themselves are, in fact, what determines their choice, and until that process was completed the outcome could have been any of the ones they were considering. This is true even if, at the end of the day, when we look at their beliefs, desires and values, there really was only one rational choice, and so that if we make them equally rational and consider all of the same points, they’d still make the same choice if we “re-ran” the choice later. The idea is indeed that the choice could have gone either way and so that if you replayed the choice the other one might have been chosen, but that’s not critical to the definition of free will nor what people feel they’ll lose if they accept determinism. What people are worried about losing is in fact that their conscious deliberations were impotent; either they are irrelevant as Coyne tends to suggest or else even the deliberations were already determined and so really seem like going through the motions.
And thus if determinism implies that the choice process is impotent and/or epiphenomenal — the conscious things you considered could be completely disconnected from the causal factors that ultimately determined your choice — then that would take away what everyone wants free will for. Merely “could have done otherwise” is a simplified way to expressing that, but in itself doesn’t encapsulate the issue.
Coyne, of course, wants to eliminate compatiblism because, to him, it stops us from really understanding how we need to structure society and so blocks reforms he wants to see:
Regardless, the important issue to me is not what you call free will, but whether you could have done otherwise at any given moment. And here everyone, including Sean, is a determinist. That view alone has enormous implications for social policy, especially in the judicial system. Why, I keep asking myself, does everyone ignore determinism—which nearly all philosophers and scientists agree on—and quibble about semantics? Compatibilism sweeps away a whole host of social issues that need to be addressed—sweeps them under the rug in favor of making people feel as if they have free will, or of formalizing misguided language that everyone uses.
The problem is that most compatiblists — Coel, who used to comment here a bit, is one of the more common ones on Coyne’s site — repeatedly point out that at least hard determinism doesn’t in fact seem to have any such benefits. Coel in that very post comments that you can have reformed justice systems without being a hard determinist because many nations — he uses Norway as an explicit example — have reformed their justice systems without it. So it’s actually quite difficult to find any real examples where Coyne’s view necessarily produces different outcomes from that of libertarians, let alone compatiblists. About the only consistent argument he gives is about retribution, which it can be claimed follows from the idea that someone made the choice to do it and therefore they deserve to be punished for it, whereas if they didn’t make that choice they wouldn’t deserve punishment or retribution. Of course, we can easily sidestep that by pointing out that, as Grammy Flash says “the problem with ‘an eye for an eye’ is that everyone ends up blind.” If you take retribution for any injury done to you, then they will take retribution for that injury you caused them, and so on and so forth, and so it never ends. But we can take an idea of restorative justice, where the punishments are meant to restore what the person took from the other or at least make up for it, and we can take the idea of protecting society from those who abuse it, and we pretty much end up where Coyne does when it comes to the justice system … while still maintaining the idea of choice and free will.
Now, Coyne would still have a point if there were no consequences to his position, but his position sweeps more problems under the rug than compatiblism does, so many that it is in fact utterly untenable in any strong form that denies compatiblisms main philosophical thrust. Coyne asks this:
Even incompatibilists like myself realize that punishment is needed to deterrence, for rehabilitation, and for keeping society safe. It adds nothing to say that the criminal could have “chosen” not to commit a crime; in fact, that corrupts our judgment. Does it improve our justice system if we say, falsely, that someone who pulled the trigger could have chosen not to do so at that moment?
Well, yes it does … or, rather, it improves our justice system to distinguish the real cases where they could not have chosen to do otherwise from those cases where they could have. Now, here what I mean by “could not have chosen to do otherwise” is in line with how I talked about it above: the determination of their choice-making processes was not what determined what action they take. In such cases, deterrence is not an option, because that requires engaging the choice-making processes and the choice-making processes aren’t actually doing the work here. Rehabilitation means removing the thing that overrides the choice-making processes, whereas for anyone else we’d need to correct the choice their choice-making processes make. And you could lock them up for the protection of society if there is no way to correct them, but in general we would consider such a person insane rather than criminal. So these people have to be treated quite differently from people who are indeed acting on what their choice-making mechanisms choose.
We can see this with the example of stealing. A kleptomaniac, by definition, only steals because they have an overwhelming compulsion to steal, and to do so even if they really don’t want to steal. They, literally, cannot choose otherwise, because every mechanism for choice is short-circuited by that compulsion. What we should do for them is remove that compulsion. This is different from someone who steals because they are too poor to afford to live otherwise. What we should do there is relieve their poverty, as they wouldn’t steal otherwise. This is different from someone who steals because they are making a bad choice, thinking that stealing is the best way to achieve their desires. For them, we should fix their erroneous and flawed choice-making processes. This is different from someone who steals because it’s the easiest way to get what they want and they don’t value the things that stealing takes from them. We need to fix their values. All of these distinctions require different mechanisms, and all of these distinctions follow naturally from the choice model that libertarians and compatiblists have adopted.
Coyne can argue that his view can take these into account as well, but it’s hard to see how that can be done without simply building in the idea of choice under another name. About the only way to do so is to classify things by stimulus — including internal stimuli — instead of appealing to “reasons”. But since all the individual stimuli will have commonalities that we will want to lump together for efficiency, we’ll end up rebuilding the exact same categories, and so again he’ll just be replicating reasons while obstinately refusing to call them that. Hardly a distinction that supports his position.
At the end of the day, choices are so fundamental to our experience and actions in the world that they are impossible to eliminate. So, compatiblists refuse to eliminate them, and to maintain that structure while denying that this entails dualism. Coyne doesn’t like it because he feels it preserves too much of the dualistic system, not realizing that any system is going to need those concepts. It is his inability to realize that that causes his enmity for compatiblism and also his inability to actually take their view on fairly, let alone refute it.
Thoughts on He-Man and the Masters of the Universe (2002)
August 27, 2018So, I just finished watching the 2002 reboot of He-Man and the Masters of the Universe. Like with “The New Adventures of He-Man”, it’s interesting to look at this in the context of the new She-Ra series to see if any lessons from it can be applied there. However, it’s also a far superior show than “The New Adventures of He-Man”, so it’s nice to look at what it managed to do right.
First, let’s start with the comparison to She-Ra. One of the things that the show is trying to do — and is driving the change in character models — is start She-Ra and her companions as being younger in order to appeal to a younger audience. Except, when He-Man and She-Ra were on TV I was that younger audience, and had absolutely no issues relating to the older characters in the shows. It doesn’t seem like we really need to have characters our age to be able to relate to them or to the show, and often shows that try that — Wesley Crusher from TNG, the Wonder Twins from Superfriends, WilyKit and WilyKat from ThunderCats, etc — end up with really annoying characters that we’re supposed to relate to but instead take up time that could go to the cooler characters. Add in that they are supposedly keeping the revolution angle and this starts to get a bit incredible.
The 2002 He-Man series, however, did actually do that, by reducing Adam and Teela in age to teenagers. And this actually worked pretty well, because it let them do things that wouldn’t have made sense in the original series with the original ages. Adam, for example, can now be portrayed not as the wastrel he had to be in the original series, but merely as someone who is immature and irresponsible because of that. As he is becoming a man, it also allows them to introduce a deeper conflict between Adam wanting to be the hero and having to become He-Man and have He-Man take the credit. And this only gets deepened by the fact that, as a teenager, Teela is often far more competitive with Adam and far more harsh on him than it would make sense for the original series Teela to be. As they are teens, she teases him, competes with him, and is harshly exasperated with his perceived uselessness and cowardice … to the point of being annoying. And, in fact, teenage Teela is, in general, pretty annoying. She’s harshly commanding at times and often oversteps her bounds and experience. And yet, that’s okay, because as a teenager she’s supposed to be annoying. Moreover, she gets called out for making those mistakes more than the original Teela could have. Man-At-Arms takes a more direct leadership role given the age issue, but Teela still gets to be in charge sometimes, mostly because she’s the daughter of the leader and has his training, which puts her above most of the troops, but she rarely is that strongly in charge if Man-At-Arms is available, which makes it more credible. De-aging her and Adam also sets them apart from the others, allowing them to talk about things in a way that the others wouldn’t necessarily understand and to play and compete against each other in a way that makes more sense. However, since most of the Masters are adults the conflict with Skeletor’s warriors seems more credible in general.
Thus, the message for the new She-Ra show is this: if you are going to de-age them, use it for something. And don’t put them into situations where they are in over their heads just because they are that young.
In general, though, the reboot respects the original while attempting to be its own show. We can see this from the beginning, where the title sequence starts with the classic introduction to the original series, only to be interrupted by Skeletor attacking, which both, to me, shows that they respect the original material and yet are going for a much more action-focused reinterpretation, and thus pretty much reflects what the show was really going to be like. They integrate storylines and items into the show quite often, and also name drop a lot of other things as well, such as the Diamond of Disappearance. They bring some classic villains into the show, upgraded. They restore Evil-Lyn as a mostly self-interested minion of Skeletor and return her snark and disdain for the other Evil Warriors. Skeletor gets his old voice back. But they do all this wrapped around far more detailed fight and action scenes, which the original series couldn’t have done.
It’s not all good, though. Orko is reduced to a complete incompetent who is insanely overconfident and full of himself, whereas he was far more of a helpful sort in the original series, which allowed him to be a sounding board and companion for Adam and He-Man when necessary. Here, only Man-At-Arms can fill that role. Cringer and Battlecat are not voiced, which loses some of the humour they could bring to the show. And the Sorceress is changed from a generally wise and individually powerful being to someone who is more harsh and commanding but does less on her own. Both of the new series did that to the Sorceress for some reason.
The new show also focuses more on multi-part episodes and arcs, which would be good except the focus on action doesn’t really leave room for any kind of development. Thus, the characters generally don’t evolve and the plots end up being simply moving from one place and/or one plot to another. Ultimately, it’s entertaining, but a bit shallow.
At the end of the day, I liked it and will probably watch it again.
Next up, the original She-Ra, Princess of Power series.
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