Richard Carrier recently wrote a post criticizing fellow atheist Erik Wielenberg’s new paper on morality, using it as a springboard to talk about what he thinks atheists are missing when they talk about morality (that’s the title of the post, BTW), by which he generally means that they don’t talk about the things he talks about and don’t align with his own view. But in responding to it, he hits a couple of points that are things that I want to note about morality in general, and so it’s worth my taking a quick look at it to highlight those points.
The first thing I want to talk about, though, is a general idea of what the debate over morality is all about, which will lead into a discussion of moral motivationalism. Carrier summarizes Wielenberg’s point and criticism of William Lane Craig as this:
For example, Wielenberg quotes Craig and Moreland as saying “What does it mean to say, for example, that the moral value justice just exists? … It is clear what is meant when it is said that a person is just; but it is bewildering when it is said that in the absence of any people, justice itself exists” (p. 33). To this Wielenberg responds, “With respect to justice, my view is that there are various obtaining states of affairs concerning justice, and that when individual people have the property of being just, it is (in part) in virtue of the obtaining of some of these states of affairs” (p. 34).
Which Carrier ultimately characterizes as this:
I am certain they’d both agree that no God is required for me to say, and be stating an objective fact even, that my girlfriend’s bedroom’s decoration is “Star-Wars-y,” in that it resembles the canonical aesthetic of the Star Wars franchise. Because that isn’t saying anything about how people should or ought to “Star-Wars-ify” their bedrooms. It’s just a neutral statement of fact that the decor meets certain defining criteria. Everyone agrees justice exists in that sense, the only sense Wielenberg ever articulates.
The thing is that both of them are wrong here, as when it comes to the philosophical discussion of morality not everyone agrees that justice or any moral term exists in that sense. Error theorists, for example, deny that moral terms — at least as moral terms — have any meaning at all, and so won’t agree that there are, in fact, any identifiable states or any set defined criteria for something being just. There might be a non-moral sense of the term “just” that has that, but in that case it won’t be a moral sense, but some other sense (practical, legal, etc). And for subjectivists, they would agree that there is a sense in which we can talk about the term “just” and apply a criteria to it, but they would deny that that sense is in any way objective and so that it is determined by the individual itself. So, for them, to use the “Star Wars” analogy they would insist that people who say that in order for a room to be “Star Warsy” it must reference the Star Wars movies are just plain wrong, and so if someone personally decides that building their room with a Star Trek aesthetic instead should count as “Star Warsy” they aren’t wrong about that and no one can say that they are. So, no, it’s not the case that everyone would agree that justice exists in that sense. Some of the most interesting philosophical debates in morality centre around people denying that very thing.
Note that it might seem odd to argue that “Star Warsy”, an aesthetic idea, is more obviously objective than morality is. The reason it is, though, is because while aesthetics can have subjective elements, here we are indeed talking about something with a clear criteria. Yes, there are gray areas — you can debate over whether including things from the prequels or sequels really counts, or from the spinoffs like “Solo” and “Rogue One” — but it’s clear that there’s some set criteria for what we mean by “Star Warsy”, which is that it has to have some critical relation to the Star Wars franchise, which is why we can say that a completely “Star Trek”-themed room wouldn’t fit that criteria. Again, there are some gray areas over how that relation would work, but we clearly say that it has to have that relation. The debate over morality is that we don’t have that sort of thing that we can say that morality has to relate to, and more importantly we can’t really justify the relations we come up with. This leads to Error Theory denying that there can be any such relation to give the terms real meaning, and subjectivists arguing that that relation is purely subjective and personal, invented out of whole cloth and up to the relevant group to define.
So if Carrier’s representation of Wielenberg’s premise is correct, then Carrier is actually correct — for the wrong reasons — that Wielenberg is not really adding anything to the discussion of morality, because all he ends up doing is asserting that there is some kind of notion of justice and other moral terms that we can appeal to that somehow follows from people as people, but that’s pretty much just what everyone else is doing. Like those atheists who try to go after “Something cannot come from nothing” by providing a something to replace the nothing, Wielenberg would be adding another potential thing to relate morality to but would need to justify that, just as people would have to if they appeal to God, or to evolution, or to the concept of morality, and so on and so forth. The issue is not coming up with alternatives, it’s with justifying that alternative so that we’d all have to accept that, yes, justice exists and has the meaning and the relation that we are claiming it has.
Of course, Carrier doesn’t think that this is what Wielenberg is missing, and what he says about that relates directly to moral motivationalism:
What Moreland and Craig are asking is how it can be the case that justice is moral, as in is “good,” and “good” not trivially, but in a way that motivates our caring about it, and indeed not just caring about it, but wanting our actions to conform to it—and indeed, wanting that more than we want anything else, otherwise we’d just laugh “justice” off as a curious aesthetic and continue preferring other styles of being. Wielenberg never answers this question. It does not even appear anywhere in his article as if anyone has ever asked this question, least of all the superstitious Earthlings he thinks he is answering but isn’t. Yet that is most definitely exactly what they are asking. So his paper is a non-response to their point.
In the comments for the post, someone else calls out Carrier for this, noting that Craig lists three separate points and that what would motivate us to act morally is only one of them, and so they are concerned about other things as well. In particular, they are interested in what I pointed out above: how can we know and justify that moral terms really mean and that they have a meaning at all? Carrier is aggressively dismissive of that, but that commenter is entirely correct that there are at least two different questions here, one about how to determine and justify objectively what those moral terms are, and one about what reason we have to actually act morally once we know what those terms are.
Now, there is a philosophical idea that links them, but it’s clearly not what Carrier is referring to here. That theory is moral motivationalism, which I came across in a graduate course on morally-minded moral philosophy a while back. The basic idea, as I understand it, is that for a morality to be valid it must in addition to being correct must also be motivating, such that it is expected that any agent capable of being moral will automatically be motivated by it. If we can conceive of something that is capable of being a moral agent that is not motivated by that morality, either we haven’t come up with the right morality or else they have some kind of mental deficiency that means that, no, they actually aren’t really moral agents. This, then, would justify Carrier’s assertion that a proper moral system must answer the question of why we should follow it.
Now, I reject moral motivationalism, and the reason I reject it is because it ends up defining most amoralities out of existence as a meaningful concept. Moral motivationalism — and Carrier’s view — imply that once one proper understands what is or isn’t moral then they must be motivated by it, and if they aren’t either they don’t properly understand morality or they are being irrational. However, it seems reasonable to imagine someone saying that they understand what morality is and what the consequences of morality are and yet they aren’t at all motivated to act morally, and we would consider such a person amoral. In general, the case that immediately springs to mind in such cases is that they understand what morality would entail but that it goes against their own personal interest, so they decide that they’d rather abandon morality in favour of their baser interests. Sure, we might think that their values are out of whack, but we couldn’t say that it must be the case that they don’t understand morality, or that they are acting irrationally and have some kind of strong mental deficiency. The strong view of moral motivationalism leaves those as the only choices, which leaves out that kind of amorality, which seems too reasonable a concept to abandon so blithely.
Now, Carrier can do that, because by his view morality follows from our highest value and so they’d have to be assessing their own values and desires incorrectly, which would indicate that they are acting irrationally. But note that this doesn’t follow from moral motivationalism, which makes it a defining trait of what it means for something to be moral. Moral motivationalism is a conceptual theory, while Carrier’s is a practical one, mostly that no one will follow a morality that doesn’t motivate us or give us a reason to act on it. The issue for Carrier, though, is that throughout his entire theory — and his idea of normativity wrt oughts — he seems to assume that we can’t change what we most value and thus most desire. He uses this idea to conclude that the way to go is to determine what it is that we, as humans, most value and then derive what is moral from that. But this violates what most distinguishes the normative from the descriptive in that normativity insists that you cannot get an ought from an is, so you cannot determine what we ought to most value from what we at least currently do most value. Sure, the one thing that pretty much all humans value highly is our own practical self-interest, but that does not mean that that really is what we ought to most value. It is indeed a valid criticism of someone to say that they need to value their own self-interest less and the self-interest of others more, and in fact this seems to be the prime function of morality. It should come as no surprise, then, that with his approach Carrier ends up arguing that practical self-interest is what we most value and so he builds his view around that, with an enlightened self-interest that eschews simple brute approaches for a more nuanced approach, but ultimately at the end of the day it really does boil morality down to personal, pragmatic self-interest.
Now, Carrier could have a point here if he could argue — which he doesn’t — that we are incapable of changing that base thing that we value more than anything else (he presumes it but doesn’t argue for it). But it does seem like we can indeed decide to value some sort of higher principle more than our simple self-interest. Yes, achieving that higher goal might make us happier, but it makes us happier because we have achieved what we most value, not because we’ve achieved our higher value of being happy by achieving that goal. So it does seem at least logically and even practically possible that someone could decide that their own self-interest is less important than morality, even if they can’t find a way to show that it would advance their own self-interest to do that. So what Carrier ends up doing is reducing morality to pragmatics, but the most paradigmatic examples of morality are cases where practical self-interest must be sacrificed in the name of morality, and it does very much seem like this is the very thing that we want morality for, so we should be very suspicious about any attempt to reduce morality to self-interest. Which is what atheists do a lot of the time when building their moral systems.
Carrier later summarizes a notion in Wielenberg about brute facts:
There is one maneuver in Wielenberg’s paper that might be conceptually useful, even though it trades on a falsehood, and doesn’t get us to what either his paper’s title or abstract promise: he makes a conditional argument of roughly the form, “If we accept theistic defenses of God as a brute fact, then we must accept my defense of moral facts as brute facts.” Wielenberg’s argument is then a fortiori: if God can be a brute fact, then it is even more likely moral facts can be brute facts, as they are far simpler in component structure (indeed, God becomes a useless epicycle: why do we need two brute facts, morality and a divine personality? If all we need is the one brute fact, what evidence remains that we have the other?). I don’t think either is likely to be a brute fact (their complexity is too great, thus requiring too improbable an existential coincidence to count on); and proposing they “are” brute facts still requires us to produce evidence that they even exist in the first place (and Wielenberg doesn’t really do that here, not in what I am pointing out is the required sense).
There are some issues here. The first is that if we are talking about morality and moral facts, God as brute fact is a more credible ground for moral facts than making moral facts brute facts, because the latter is simply assuming the conclusion while the former is saying that if this entity exists then we can ground morality, and the discussion over whether the existence of God is a brute fact or not is separate from the direct discussion of moral facts. After all, maybe it’s not the case that we need to accept the existence of God as a brute fact and can actually justify it. Second, the issue for morality is that we want a justification for moral facts, and so subjectivists and Error Theorists won’t accept a statement that they are simply brute facts. In fact, they will use that as an argument in favour of their positions, arguing that if the best we can do is make them brute facts then they aren’t objective facts at all. While moral facts wouldn’t be brute facts if they are based on God — even if God’s existence must be set as a simple brute fact — we’d still want a justification for God’s existence before we’d accept an objective morality based on God. And finally, those who argue that the existence of God is a brute fact in general don’t just assert it, but instead try to argue that the existence of God must be a brute fact because of the nature of God. No such argument exists for moral facts, nor does it seem like such an argument can exist. So this move simply doesn’t work from a philosophical perspective.
Carrier goes on to talk about how to ground moral facts, and he wants to ground them in physical facts, but his thought experiment is problematic because it seems to rely on a strict consequentialism that when we consider his thought experiment we are inclined to abandon:
One might ask whether it is moral for a sociopath who does not at all care about others “to torture the innocent just for fun” so long as they are always appropriately consenting adults. Yes, that sounds like some sort of moral Gettier Problem. But think about it. Do we mean to classify mere mental stances as moral or immoral? Or is that sociopath still “behaving morally”? The fact that you are asking that question would mean the question itself has quite a lot to do with what you care about. What is more important, that a sociopath think correctly, or that they always behave in ways you will not find alarming and a social problem to deal with? It’s difficult to intuitively answer that question because it is nigh impossible to decouple “thinking correctly” from “always behaving in correct ways.” Because the very reason you might give to be concerned about “thinking incorrectly” is simply that an incorrect mindset risks causing incorrect behavior; and we can’t really conceive of an incorrect mindset perfectly reliably producing nothing but correct behavior. That would require such an extraordinary set of coincidences as to not even contemplate as a possibility worth considering. Bad minds simply are dangerous because they cause bad behavior. That’s really the only rational reason to care about them. But that would leave bad behavior as the actual thing we have any ground to care about. And even when they are logically inseparable (e.g. you will adjudge pretending to love you as bad, therefore the goods of love can only exist for you with a good mindset in the one who loves you; they are effectively synonymous), we’re still talking about which natural facts we care about.
Which gets us to the physical sense in which Wielenberg’s statement is false. Imagine a world (and indeed, someday someone may even be able to produce and live in it, whether that’s a good idea or not) where “torturing the innocent just for fun” cures all diseases and disorders (mental and physical), up to and including restoring youth and fitness to the elderly, and where nothing else effects any such cure, and where anyone who isn’t ever tortured, rapidly ages and accumulates diseases and disorders endlessly until they become a gibbering, incompetent lunatic—who can be at once fully restored if someone tortures them just for fun. It’s hard to argue that in that universe it is “morally wrong to torture the innocent just for fun.” In that universe, to the contrary, it is arguably morally right to do so. All because we simply changed the physical facts. Which seems to indicate that moral facts are grounded in natural facts.
Okay. How might we push back on that? You could say that, well, the competent should still have to consent. But that won’t apply to those who have become so ailed they lack competence to consent. At that point, is it really more moral to let them die in gibbering madness than to torture them for fun and thereby cure them? We do, after all, deem it moral to perform painful and invasive procedures on children and the insane, when there is sufficient need to, such as to preserve their own life or limb. And in this bizarre alternative world, that’s basically what “torturing the innocent just for fun” simply does. So it seems evident that changing the natural facts, changes the moral facts. Or you might try to argue the world proposed is impossible, but I doubt it (once we have virtual worlds to play in, the “impossible” will have a lot less meaning), and in any case, all you are then arguing is still that the moral fact you insist upon derives from some physical fact (like, the intentions of the “torturer,” or the physical impossibility of “selfish intentions” ever being consistently aligned with “unselfish outcomes”). You thus have just grounded moral facts in natural facts again. You can’t escape this. No matter how you try to maneuver, all you end up doing is defending the same conclusion: moral facts are grounded in physical, hence natural facts.
Now, the main issue here is that we have to ensure that the sociopath is torturing the person just for fun but that the consequences are hugely beneficial. In order to maintain, though, that the sociopath is torturing the person just for fun we need to accept that the main purpose of the sociopath is not to de-age that person, but instead is just for their own personal pleasure. And that personal pleasure cannot be based on them feeling that they have done a good deed by de-aging that person, or else they’d be doing it to de-age them and not for fun. And so the best way to describe the mental state of the sociopath here has to be that in that world it happens to be the case that torturing the person will have those good consequences, but the sociopath would still torture them if it didn’t, and in fact would torture them even if it aged them significantly. So, ultimately, at a minimum they don’t care if it benefits their victim or not, and instead would do it no matter what the consequences to the victim were.
This is, at best, a strongly amoral stance. And yet it is the stance that is required for the sociopath to really be doing it “just for fun”. So we have an intuitive feeling when we shake out the thought experiment that the sociopath isn’t acting morally here. The only way to oppose that is to argue that the consequences themselves are what determines whether or not it is moral, and so it doesn’t matter that the sociopath doesn’t care about the consequences, which is a very strong form of consequentialism. But we reject that strong a notion, because it leads to ludicrous notions like someone who tries to poison someone and the result is that the poison cures a more fatal disease they had (that could be an episode of “House M.D.”!) is not someone who attempted murder but is instead a moral person, while someone who gave a person an antibiotic to cure their disease which ends up killing them because the disease they had was preventing a more serious condition (this actually was an episode of “House M.D.”) is, from the moral perspective, a murderer. The only way to make Carrier’s argument work leaves those counter-intuitive cases open.
Hence, intentionalism, which is the idea that what matters most in determine if the action taken by someone is their intention when they did it as opposed to the strict consequences. So if someone intended to poison someone to death but inadvertently lengthens their life, then they are still, at least, attempted murderers, and if someone is trying to cure someone and inadvertently cures them, then they are not murderers and did the morally correct thing. People tend to argue against this by pointing to cases where someone does something that could put people’s lives at risk inconsiderately and ends up killing someone and noting that by this model since they didn’t intend to kill someone they couldn’t be considered to have done anything wrong, but in that case we can note that they did intend to be careless and inconsiderate and so we can easily say that they were negligent because their intention was, indeed, to be negligent in taking that action, while acknowledging that if they actually had checked everything they reasonably could they would have done nothing wrong. And from this, we can conclude that since the sociopath would torture that person regardless of the consequences they are still acting at best amorally, which means that the change in the physical facts does not change the moral facts in that case, refuting Carrier’s point.
The thing is, this debate is misunderstanding morality in general. I can never remember which way he stated it, but Bertrand Russell, I believe, divided the moral space up into two broad categories, one which defines the basic moral principles that we use to determine what is or isn’t moral in general and one which takes those principles and applies them to the world to determine what the moral thing to do is in specific cases. Every single moral code worth talking about has this division between the conceptual principles of morality and the practical application of those principles to our everyday lives. Yes, even Kant, as his principles are imperatives that we then apply. While he is chided for making “Don’t lie” a universal principle, that’s actually an application of his imperatives, not a set rule. As a logical conclusion, it’s not really amenable to being changed if the physical facts of the world change, but things that follow from “Treat people as ends in themselves and not merely as means” very much could be. And, of course, Utilitarianism has “Maximize utility” as its conceptual principle that we have to work out specifically with every action we take.
No one, then, denies that the physical facts of the world will impact the practical application of moral principles. If your base moral principle, for example, is “Reduce suffering” then obviously the practical application of that will depend greatly on what causes and doesn’t cause suffering. But that principle itself won’t change if you change the physical facts about the world, at least not for most moral principles. And any moral principles that would change risk being descriptive instead of normative as they would follow from “ises”, and moral principles need to be oughts and so need to be normative. So to go down the route of arguing that moral facts follow from physical facts usually ends up arguing that moral principles follow from physical facts, which means they follow from “ises”, which means they aren’t normative. So it’s not a move that anyone should want to make.
Ultimately, there are issues to consider here, but Carrier does not do it and it doesn’t seem like Wielenberg does it either. The philosophical discussions of moral motivationalism and normativity are far more interesting and challenging than what we find here, which is why it was nice for me to be able to talk more about them while talking about this post of Carrier’s.
Thoughts on “Party of Five” (Season 3)
April 27, 2022While it may be a bit odd to say this about a season where one character develops a serious drinking problem, my overall impression of Season 3 is that it’s a season where nothing much important or momentous happens, and so its plots return to what one would expect from a family drama.
More on that later, but let me start with what is probably the most momentous plot of the season, which also paves the way for Kirsten to exit the series. After getting back together at the end of Season 2, they settle into a more “living together” type of situation as Kirsten starts to put together her post-academic career, and ends up getting a really great job … that requires her to work a fair commute away from the house, which means that she’s away from home a lot, which Charlie doesn’t like. The conflict over this lasts one episode before the really big issue is raised: Kirsten is accused of plagiarism in her doctoral thesis and falls into a deep depression, so much so that she doesn’t even defend herself at the hearing. It turns out that that happened after the failed wedding and she was clinically depressed, and Charlie pushes her to mention that to maybe get a break, but as already noted she refuses, and loses her degree and that great job, and falls deeper into depression.
There are a couple of things to talk about here, but let me start with the more minor one. Academics is another thing that I’m not-so-casual about, and I find the whole plagiarism story line a bit odd and confusing. When she’s confronted about it, it seems like she copied without proper citation about a page and a half of text, which it is later stated is a specific study. Well, a page and a half isn’t exactly a lot of text in a doctoral thesis which is much, much longer than that, so that she might have forgotten to cite that, as she herself noted, wouldn’t seem to demand that it be invalidated. So it would have to have been something really important, and so fundamental to the thesis itself, so either it was essentially the theory she had that she was talking about or a critical study that proved her case correct. Essentially, it would have to be more than that she copied some text without citation, but instead something that cast doubt that she actually did the work necessary for the thesis. But we know that she did the work and if the thesis was copied someone would have caught it before it was shown to some random person. Now, again, plagiarism is a big deal in academics and so perhaps it would be the case that any such thing in a doctoral thesis would garner the same response, but as someone who has done academics a bit more than the average person if I’m puzzled by it I think most of the audience will be puzzled by it as well. It just doesn’t seem to be a big enough deal to garner that sort of response.
The other issue is that this all comes completely out of nowhere. There’s no hint that this was coming or that Kirsten was indeed that depressed at that point. So this is another example of the show reaching for drama! as they seem to need to break Kirsten and Charlie up and want to do that with a complex and dramatic depression story line and will bend the rules of the universe to make that work. After all, this move completely invalidates the issue they set up with Charlie not being happy about her wonderful new job and all of the problems it caused due to the distance it was from the house. They moved her into an apartment there so that she could stay for three days a week and then have to move her back afterwards. So it’s a sharp shift in direction that seems to be done just for drama, when the original case had more than enough dramatic tension to work as a plot.
At any rate, Kirsten falls into a full-on depression again, and nothing can snap her out of it. Claudia eventually calls her parents, who helped her through the last one but whom Kirsten did not want called because they are, rightly, very unhappy with Charlie, and so they come out and do what they both feared: take Kirsten away back home. They don’t keep Charlie informed about how things are going, but eventually Charlie goes out there and finds out that she’s a lot better, and she convinces him to simply leave and go back to San Francisco together … but then she falls into a depression again and concludes that the problem is him, that being with him reminds her of the wedding issues and makes her fall back into the old patterns … which in hindsight doesn’t make a lot of sense since having her entire academic world destroyed was probably more responsible for her later depression, but that’s what they go with. Anyway, he leaves and it seems that it is finally over, but Charlie being Charlie he’s not alone for long as he ends up taking up with Grace, someone from the local homeless shelter and food drive who almost ruins his life when he doesn’t want to sign up for the food program — she accuses him of being a privileged white guy in the paper — but then falls in love with him.
I didn’t care much for the Grace plot, which runs off-and-on for the rest of the season. It doesn’t help that the relationship started before he broke things off with Kirsten — this is the traditional way relationships work in this family, as Bailey does that with Callie and Julia does the serial version in this season — but there was an interesting sideline where he really wanted a friend instead, which is rare for him. But it doesn’t take long for him to upgrade the relationship to a romantic one once things end with Kirsten, another example where an interesting thread was introduced and then dropped for another, more dramatic! one. Then, with good reason, Claudia and Julia are not happy with her replacing Kirsten, especially since it wasn’t all that long after things ended with Kirsten. But then this isn’t followed up on and instead they end up with her running for city councilor, which Charlie opposes at first but then in the next episode is very supportive of, even doing her campaigning better than she did. This could have been the set-up for him replacing her as the candidate, but again any idea with that is quickly dropped and the idea that she doesn’t want to have kids is raised, but she finds out that Kirsten couldn’t have kids and so wonders what the difference is other than it being a choice. Well, we know what the issue is: Kirsten really wanted kids and Grace doesn’t, and that might cause issues considering that Charlie already has kids. And so they raise the “doesn’t get along with Claudia and Owen” angle again, despite the fact that the only evidence at this time was that she didn’t want to spend time or pay attention to them while busy with the campaign, which is pretty reasonable. I think they needed to lean in to the statements she made about the kids being his and being dumbfounded that he would give up a relationship that he wanted for the kids when he retorts that that’s what it means to be a parent. The idea that she didn’t want the kids to be hers and would always consider them his kids that she was tolerating would be more than sufficient reason for Charlie to note that he really needs someone who was going to be more involved, especially since Owen was just turning four and was going to be looking for someone who didn’t treat him like someone else’s kid that she was looking after at times.
Anyway, this leads to one of the big issues with the season: the show seems to set up a number of little plots that it then quickly drops to focus on something else. We start with Kirsten’s job and the tension that might cause but then abandon it completely in favour of the plagiarism plot. As just noted, that happens a couple of times in Grace’s plot. After Bailey appeals to Sara to help him get sober, she gets a boyfriend to scupper any potential resumption of the relationship with Bailey for two whole episodes before she dumps him but still tells Bailey she doesn’t want to get back together, which could have happened those two episodes ago and avoided introducing that character. Julia gets a case where she wants to go to Europe with Justin which causes a problem with her latest boyfriend but that gets ditched in favour of her trying to do fun things and be free when her boyfriend finally discovers responsibility and buys into a motorcycle repair shop. Claudia meets with the guy who played with her mother and he offers to get her into his conservatory, which Charlie scuppers, and then that’s never really brought up again. There’s also a potential connection with his son that is dropped. And so on and so forth. It almost seems like they try to generate a whole bunch of threads that they could run with which they drop if they come up with something better, which usually means more dramatic!. This isn’t necessarily a bad idea, but the threads they generate are too obviously such sorts of threads and so aren’t something that they could develop if they want to but that the audience will forget about once replaced by something else. There are also so many of them that it becomes a bit ridiculous. Also, the other threads might have been more interesting but the ones that they are replaced with only have the virtue of at least seeming more dramatic, but I can’t help but feel that some of the other threads would have worked better, or that at least jumping to them would have saved some time that could have been used on other plots.
I think that’s the issue that I’m having that makes me feel like little of importance happened. Yes, the plots were dramatic, but for the most part they don’t really let us learn anything about new about the characters nor does it seem like it’s going to be the impetus for them to make major changes in their characters. Sure, it’s dramatic for Bailey to become an alcoholic, but all that plot will do is try to return him to the person he was, and the reason he gives for becoming that is the one that he already complained about before. How Charlie loses Kirsten isn’t going to change his outlook on life, and what makes him dump Grace is a lesson he should and likely did learn a long time ago. And so on. They’re dramatic, but don’t really add to the characters in any way.
What I think the show likely got props for and deserves props for is that unlike other family dramas it doesn’t take these dramatic situations and settle them simply in one episode, but both extends the plots to show the lead-up and the aftermath, but also references the issues later and has it cause issues later. Julia’s pregnancy, for example, was “resolved” with a convenient miscarriage, but it has consequences for the rest of the season and pops up here as well, as well as having an impact on Bailey and Sara (as they were just going to have sex when her getting pregnant scared them out of it). As noted, Kirsten’s depression is not a one-and-done thing and ultimately that she would not escape that depression ends the relationship with Charlie. For Bailey, Claudia finds out that her father was an alcoholic as well and that her mother threatened to leave him if he didn’t quit, and so tries to do the same thing to Bailey. In an ordinary family drama, this would work, but here it doesn’t and it takes him hurting Sara in a car accident to get him to seek help. They don’t make these sorts of conditions trivial or easily solved, and they have ripples that carry over to the next episodes.
A couple of minor issues. The first is that Claudia gets little focus or plots in this season, but ends up having an incredibly bad year, watching the family fall apart and argue with each other, her favourite sibling fall into alcoholism, being left to manage the house and then getting yelled at when she makes mistakes when she shouldn’t have been doing that alone anyway, and having a great opportunity taken away from her for what even to the audience seem like terrible reasons. Lacey Chabert does a great job playing the character that all of these things are happening to, but I really wish the season had done more with the character than try to find ways to make her miserable.
The second is how terribly the character of Libby was treated. She started out in the pilot as Julia’s friend, but was dropped because she admittedly would not have fit well with the “wild” Julia that was developing there. She’s then brought back to be a minor rival for love interest Justin who gets horribly dumped soon afterwards. We don’t hear from her again until her last episode, where she gets one line to show that she’s a bit ambivalent about being accepted to Harvard and then kills herself from the pressure of that, an event that does nothing more than prompt Julia to not go to college, at least right away. She exists only to provide plot elements for Julia, and nothing else, which I find very disappointing given that I liked the character.
For all of my complaints, the show is still entertaining enough that I’m not regretting watching it. I feel that this season isn’t as good as the other two but that probably follows from the fact that it doesn’t have as momentous — for the characters — plots as the other two and so is more in line with what you’d see in most other family dramas. Which wouldn’t be a bad thing, but it is a bit of a let down from what happened before. I also like a number of the performances, especially Lacey Chabert’s, and Jennifer Love Hewitt’s Sara can be interesting when she comes across as being nice and less as being forceful. Still, this is definitely heading for the box of shows that I might watch again at some point.
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