Following on from the post I looked at last week, Jonathan continues with a post talking about why he’s not an ideologue but is perhaps a semi-ideologue. The main problem here is that what he really seems to be trying to do is continue to argue for why voting against someone on the basis that you don’t like them is acceptable and reasonable, while adding the idea the voting based on strict party affiliation is also acceptable and reasonable. He admits that they may not count as rational, but that they are what we in general actually do and it’s okay to do that. Again, as noted last time, the odd thing about this is that he’s facing some criticisms that Gad Saad are leveling against liberals for not voting for Donald Trump and is trying to defend himself and liberals against that while ignoring that these are objections that liberals level against conservatives for voting for Donald Trump and not voting for Hilary Clinton. After all, many conservatives claimed that they didn’t like Hilary Clinton and many conservatives still just voted Republican because that’s the party they are affiliated with. Now, I haven’t gone back in his history to see if he makes the same complaints against conservatives, but he doesn’t note that liberals make the same — presumably invalid — arguments, and he gives short shrift to the idea that liberals had plenty of actual, non-feeling reasons for not voting for Donald Trump. This strong a defense, then, seems like it can only be spawned by Jonathan feeling that despite all the reasons that one might have had to prefer Hilary Clinton, he, at least, only did it because he didn’t like Trump and Clinton was a Democrat, and so has to defend himself from a strong charge that his choice was irrational.
Now, he does try to make the case that, at least sometimes, that can be justified, at least in part based on values:
The idea of being tribal is not looking that bad anymore. Even if we blindly voted against Trump based on gut feelings, which eighty percent of us do when torn between our reasons and feelings, it still would be rational to vote based on partisanship because it is a heuristic. It is a shortcut that increases the likelihood that our values and interests will be carried out.
So the idea would have to be this: even if a candidate doesn’t seem like they share our values, and even if we don’t like the candidate, we might be reasonable voting for them if they belong to a party that we believe shares our values, even over a candidate that seems to share more of our values and is advocating for policies that seem to better fit out interests. He’s quick to argue that we don’t really do that consciously anyway, but it is in fact at least potentially reasonable. The reason is that values are, as noted last time, the things that we care about, and so we want a candidate who cares about the same things we care about so that they will make the same decisions that we would make. The problem with this if the candidate is promising to do things that we want done while the other candidate is promising to do things we don’t want done is that it looks like they aren’t going to make the decisions we would want them to make. However, if the candidate is part of a party whose values match ours, then even if they don’t agree with us on those specific issues they are likely to have values that match that of the party, and so in the many, many decisions that will arise where they haven’t so far stated their position they will act on the basis of those values that the party, we, and presumably they share. The counter to that is that their disagreement on those specific policies already indicates a difference in values and in what decisions they’d make, and so you have no reason to think that they will decide things on the basis of the values the party shares with you or on any set of values that they share with you, while the other candidate, if they can be trusted, already has committed to making the same decisions you would. Even given that, though, it’s not unreasonable to say that if they belong to a certain party, and you share the values of that party, then it’s reasonable to vote for them even if they don’t necessarily seem to share your values. For a President, they have limited influence over the party itself and so their values won’t necessarily impact their values, but then they act more independently and so their specific values are more important. For a Prime Minister, as the head of the party — in parliamentary systems, at least — they have a much greater ability to change the values of the party to their own, but anything they do has to come through the party itself and so whatever they do will have to conform to the values of the party and not just their own party. Either way, a case can be made either way.
But the only reason to defend voting on the basis of party affiliation is when someone is going to vote for the party because they’ve always voted for that party regardless of whether they still believe or have looked to see if the values of that party still align with their values. However, if the party’s values have shifted and no longer align with theirs, and if another party better fits their values, then all of the arguments above about how that can be reasonable go out the window. If you vote a straight party ticket because that party is the one that best reflects what your values and what you feel your interests are, then that’s reasonable. If you vote for a party that you may or even do despise because you’ve always voted for that party, then that’s not reasonable and is definitely irrational.
So the only argument that he has left is the argument that this is, in fact, what we actually do:
First, all the evidence suggests that our feelings towards a candidate, particularly from the values that they hold, predict voting behavior better than us sitting down and reasoning. Not that we didn’t use any reasoning at all, but it was the feelings that the candidate triggered in us that made us vote. Even when voters were torn between their reasons and feelings, 80% of them went with their gut.
The problem is that this is, in fact, the naturalistic fallacy. Gad Saad — and anyone who makes these arguments — are not denying that people do make choices based on emotions or gut feelings or other irrational bases like party affiliation. They are instead saying that people shouldn’t act on that basis, and that instead we ought to act based on reason and a strong consideration of our interests. So no one should vote on the basis that they don’t like a candidate, or on the basis of a strong party affiliation. The counters here, then, don’t address that, as they all involve coming up with reasons why it’s not irrational to make that choice. If it really was “irrational” to make that choice, then none of those arguments would do anything at all, and if it was rational to make that choice in those circumstances then all they need to do is give those rational reasons instead of trying to come up with a way to justify the action in general, even when those reasons and arguments wouldn’t apply.
As someone who is at least Stoic-leaning, it’s this that drives my insistence on the use of reason over things like emotion. If I could make a rational argument for why what emotion is telling me to do is the right thing to do in a particular instance, then it seems like I should simply rely on that rational argument instead of on the emotion, because the outcome would be the same. But if it can ever be the case that I could rationally demonstrate that the emotion is telling me to do the wrong thing — meaning something irrational — then I really, really shouldn’t be taking the advice of the emotion and shouldn’t do what the emotion is saying that I should do. So in all cases, reason will be right, and the emotion will only be right when it aligns with reason, so we might as well just rely on reason. The same thing applies here. The only cases where liking a candidate or party affiliation should determine how we vote are the cases where we can make a specific, rational argument that those things should do that. So any defense of them in general, and specifically any defense of them in general in opposition to reason cannot work, as all it can do is say that we should do something irrational. The arguments in this post are pretty much of that kind.
Now, of course, there are some issues in determining what it means to be rational in the first place, as Jonathan notes:
When we say that we vote purely on the issues and separate personalities, it is because we want to convince others that we are rational. Why would we need to do this? Because we have a strong drive to conform with a payoff of approval. But where did this definition of rationality come from? It came from the Enlightenment era which places an emphasis on maximizing our self-interest or, in economics language, “utility”. The Enlightenment era assumed that reason is both conscious and emotion-free.
As someone who is Stoic-leaning, I agree that reason should be conscious and as free from emotion as we can possibly get, mostly because emotion and instinct have an oversized influence on our actions and yet often get things wrong. So we can’t simply rely on it without checking it consciously. However, I agree that we’ve tended to get reason wrong by assuming that the only rational action to take is one that maximizes self-interest, specifically simple material interest. Reason in and of itself doesn’t have or relate to goals, but is just there to tell you how to get to the goals you have. Simple material self-interest is, of course, one goal, but if we put it that baldly we should all be able to see that that’s not a particularly meaningful goal for humans. We should want more than simple material self-interest, and so if we should have some kind of deeper goal then it cannot be a defining property of reason that it leads us to that specific goal, only that it would lead us to that goal if that’s the goal we happen to select. And we can also use reason to determine what goal we should have and, well, anything of importance to us. We see this error in the associations of Game Theory to morality, which end up concluding that our own simple material self-interest is the driving force behind morality. But our goals follow from our values, and we can — and should — value things other than simple material self-interest, and it can be argued (as I have done many times in the past) that morality is about those other values. As for how that relates to emotions, it is not our emotions that create our values but our values that create our emotions. Our values determine what we care about and our emotions are triggered by what we care about. But our values can be rationally assessed, and we can change what we value based on rational arguments as well.
Which leads to the complaint about liberals that is being addressed in this post:
A lot of political psychologists and cognitive scientists are claiming that Democrats will continue to be unsuccessful at changing minds because they try to appeal to facts and figures.
This isn’t the problems with Democrats. Democrats in general appeal to more than facts and figures in making all of their arguments. The problem with Democrats, as far as I can see, is that they assume that everyone has the same values as they do and so are puzzled when they make their arguments and many people are not moved. It is, of course, true that simple facts and figures don’t make for convincing arguments, because all arguments need to relate to some kind of end goal and that requires values. If you say that it’s 30 degrees outside and sunny, that’s not, in and of itself, going to make any kind of argument. But if you’re talking about whether you should go for a walk or whether it indicates global warming and whether that means that something should be done about that, then we provide a context that includes goals and values and so we can use those facts and figures to make an actual argument. On the rare occasions that Democrats just give facts and figures, they give them in a presumed context of the values they themselves have, and then are puzzled when those facts and figures don’t have the same import to their opponents as they have to them. I have seen in the past few years that despite so many of them calling for the use of empathy, they seem to have a complete inability to grasp the values of those who disagree with them and so are unable to understand them, and so cannot forge an argument that can appeal to them. It seems like Democrats — or at least the strongly progressive ones — are much more upset by certain things than most people are, and cannot understand why most people aren’t equally bothered by that. But that is indeed because they don’t share the values of their opponents, and are incapable of understanding the values their parents have.
But you can make arguments appealing to values that you yourself do not share. However, to do that you have to understand them. So we don’t really need values-infused arguments. Pretty much any actual argument already is. We need to be able to understand the values of others and try to craft our arguments from their perspective. This is where Democrats fail.
Thoughts on “King John”
July 27, 2022The next play is “King John”, which is another dramatic history, this time examining a revolt against King John — of Richard the Lion-Hearted and Robin Hood fame — which ultimately leads to King John’s death. One important character is given the appellation “Bastard”, and is the illegitimate son of Richard the Lion-Hearted, which gets Richard and John’s mother Elinor to support him and get him into the royal household, where he ends up as a commentator on what is going on. I don’t mind the character and his speeches are among the most clever out of all of them, but ultimately he seems like an overly convenient character, able to advocate for peace or for war as required but without us getting a really clear sense of what his own goals or desires are, and so no clear sense of why he would do that. He’s also an exceptionally strong warrior who is claimed to turn around an entire battle all on his own, which is a mild annoyance, especially given how unclear the character himself is.
The big flaw, at least for me, in this play is that there is almost no banter and even the conversations occur in speeches, not banter. That’s not necessarily a bad thing, but the speeches are often long-winded and repetitive. I find Constance — the mother of the man who is to be put on the throne instead of John — the worst, as she is often given a long speech that basically boils down to “You suck!” only to be followed by another long speech saying the same thing when the person she’s talking to demurs. If you’re going to do dialogue through speeches the speeches really need to say something important and meaningful. Style, which Shakespeare has in abundance, doesn’t cut it, and too much of the time that’s all he has here. Some of them are better, but a lot of them, especially early on, are just boring and, again, repetitive.
I also noted something about the histories vs the more famous dramas, starting from “Romeo and Juliet” and leading on into the ones I most remember, like “Hamlet” and “Macbeth”: the plot in the histories seems to be nothing more than to give a dramatic retelling of the history, while the others have full-on plots. Here, all I could say about the play is that it is the telling of an insurrection against King John that leads to his death, but for the others I could summarize their plots in a few sentences and have them sound interesting, such as “The tragedy of two star-crossed lovers from feuding families” for “Romeo and Juliet”, or “A Prince of Denmark attempts to deal with his usurping stepfather” for “Hamlet” or “An ambitious man and his wife murder the king to usurp his crown” for “Macbeth”. I don’t think I could say that for any of the histories. I wonder if I’ll feel the same way about “Julius Caesar”, which in premise is probably more a history than a tragic drama, although given that the ones so far are histories of England perhaps the audience knew more and had more of an attachment to it than the others which allowed the history to be presented as a history itself and not as something more. I hasten to add that there’s nothing wrong with histories, as on that very point they are something that the audience at the time might well enjoy as much if not more than the others. It’s just that they’d tend to have less universal appeal, which could very well explain why those histories, at least, are not among the more famous of Shakespeare’s plays.
In contrast to “A Midsummer Night’s Dream”, this one returns to the model that inferior Shakespeare is still pretty good. As I already said, Shakespeare has style in abundance which makes the repetitive speeches tolerable, even if not good. I didn’t dislike the play, but didn’t find it particularly interesting either.
Up next is “The Taming of the Shrew”, a comedy that I enjoyed in high school but that I might not enjoy now. Will it be the first Shakespearean comedy that I really liked? We’ll find out.
Tags:Shakespeare
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