A Moral God?

I’m not popular enough to draw the attention to get these sorts of questions answered, but I’d like people who think that “The Problem of Evil” is an issue to basically think about this:

If I deny that I care about having a “loving” God, but claim that omnibenevolent translates to “all-good” which, to me, translates to “perfectly moral”, how does that impact the Problem of Evil? Does it change the approach in any way? Are there any different considerations? Or does the question work out exactly the same way?

Because, to me, I want a moral God, not necessarily a loving one. And a moral God is required for either solution to Euthyphro’s paradox. But if I analyze the Problem of Evil in terms of morality, I find that by most of the major moralities the Problem of Evil is not, in fact, any kind of disproof, because all of them could allow for allow suffering to exist on the basis of other criteria, criteria that we think might exist in this world. Love, however, might not, depending on how one defines it.

So, am I right, or wrong? Why or why not?

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